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ABSTRACT:  
The aim of this research study is to analyse multilingualism in the EU from an interdisciplinary 
perspective between translation and EU law. The EU as a multilingual legal system will be 
examined, focusing on the legal and political reasons behind the current language regime. This 
paper also aims at elucidating the effects that linguistic diversity has on the interpretation of EU 
legislation. There are twenty-three official languages and EU texts published in the different 
languages are equally authentic (Article 55 TFEU). But do rules carry the same legal 
implication in more than one language? 
 
RESUM: 
Aquest treball té com a objectiu analitzar el multilingüisme a la Unió europea des d’una 
perspectiva interdisciplinària entre traducció i dret de la Unió europea. Aquest article estudia la 
Unió com a un sistema multilingüe, amb especial èmfasi en les raons jurídiques i polítiques 
darrera l’actual règim lingüístic. També s’intentarà examinar els efectes que la diversitat 
lingüística té en la interpretació de la legislació europea. Hi han vint i tres llengües oficials i els 
textos publicats en les diferents llengües son igualment autèntics (Article 55 TFUE). Però les 
regles poden tenir la mateixa implicació jurídica en mes d’una llengua? 
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“Multilingualism is in the genetic code of the Union” - 
Leonard ORBAN, Speech/07/10 
 
Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil? 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union is a unique endeavour, consisting in the integration by peaceful 
means of a group of States which are willing to render part of their sovereignty to a 
supranational entity. The uniqueness of the EU lies in its specific legal nature since it is 
not just a cooperative body; it is a union with power to legislate within the framework 
of the competences conferred by the Member States (Article 5 TEU). Most of its 
legislation is directly applicable and binding in every Member State1. In addition, 
individuals can, under the principle of direct effect, invoke a provision of the EU before 
a national court. Not only can treaties, regulations and decisions produce direct effect 
but directives also can, under special requirements.2 Therefore, unlike other 
international organisations, the EU addresses States and also individuals, i.e. natural 
persons or legal entities in the Member States (Berteloot 2001:2). 
The fact that EU law produces rights and obligations for individuals justifies the 
rendering of its texts in all its official languages. It is necessary for citizens to have 
access to EU legislation in their own languages (Dengler 2010:97; Felici 2010:95; 
Wagner 2001:67). “Multilingualism in the law can be effective only if the legal subjects 
affected by a given legal instrument are guaranteed equality before the law in all 
language versions” (Šarčević 2010:23).  
Therefore, translation plays a fundamental role in the EU. Over time, translation 
services have adapted to face the challenges of translating in an enlarged Union from 
the original six to its current twenty-seven Member States. However, despite the crucial 
importance of translation, the term “language version” instead of “translation” is used, 
because in the EU texts in different languages are equally authentic (Article 55 TFEU). 
“Translation is a ‘means’ without ‘status’, whose existence is nowhere mentioned” 
(Felici 2010: 95). But is it possible to have twenty-three “authentic” versions? Can rules 
carry identical normative implications in twenty-three languages?  
It is sometimes inevitable that linguistic divergences emerge among the different 
versions of multilingual texts (Kuner 1991:958) because each language shapes the 
world in a different way and each country has a different legal system. In cases of 
doubt, the Court of Justice of the EU is responsible for interpreting EU law (Article 267 
                                                            
1 For legal acts of the EU, see Article 288 TFEU 
2 See Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] E.C.R. 1337.  
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TFEU) based on the premise that no language version prevails over others and that it is 
necessary to interpret them uniformly, i.e., in the light of the versions existing in other 
languages.3 
The Court clearly expressed that “the different language versions of a Community text 
must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in case of divergence between the 
versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and 
general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part”.4 In addition, “the real intention of 
its author and the aim he seeks to achieve” must also be taken into account.5 In this way, 
the Court ensures uniform interpretation of EU law because all versions constitute the 
same legal instrument. 
The initiative for this research started after studying Translation and Interpretation at the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and completing my double master’s degree in EU 
Integration (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) and European Law: Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Université Toulouse Capitole). The need to carry out 
interdisciplinary research grew as it became increasingly obvious that law is at the core 
of legal translation and, at the same time, law is a matter of legal language (Prieto 
Ramos 2009). Multilingualism is a transversal issue that has a profound impact on the 
lives of European citizens. Subtleties of language can result in complicated legal issues. 
Expressing the same reality in different languages is therefore crucial for the 
implementation of EU policies and the enforcement of EU legislation.  
Methodology 
This study will have two parts. First, the language regime will be explained and I will 
then focus on multilingualism and the rationale behind it. For that purpose, the 
principles of direct effect, the supremacy of EU law and legal certainty will be 
examined. Case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union will be of great 
importance since these principles have been developed over the years and by means of 
the different judgements of the Court. The debate around the sustainability of the 
current language regime will also be considered, including the diverging opinions for 
and against it. 
                                                            
3 See Case 19/67 van der Vecht [1967] E.C.R. 345. 
4 Case 30/77 Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] E.C.R. 1999, para 14. 
5 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 41. 
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Secondly, the study will then centre on how this multilingual EU system affects the 
interpretation of EU law, since the texts in the twenty-three official languages are 
equally authentic. Can rules carry the same legal implication in more than one 
language? It is believed that linguistic divergences are inevitable because of the nature 
of each language. This second part will include some practical examples of linguistic 
divergences between versions of EU texts. The way in which the Court of Justice of the 
EU reconciles the texts will also be examined. 
OBJECT OF STUDY 
The EU constitutes a legal order with its own features, its own personality and its own 
legal capacity.6 Therefore, legal translators in this context do not really mediate 
between two legal systems, although they do mediate between two languages.  This 
does not mean that translating in the EU context is easy; translators face other kinds 
of problems (Kjær 1999: 66) and other factors come into play in the translation of 
legal texts (Šarčević 2010:19). 
Despite translating within the same legal system, it must be taken into consideration 
that the EU legal order is composed of twenty-seven Member States, each with its 
own legal system, and this poses a challenge for translators. EU texts follow certain 
formalisms and a standardised legal terminology. In fact, the Court of Justice of the 
EU has stated that “legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in 
community law and in the law of the various member states”.7   
This project is framed within the scope of Legal Translation and Supranational Law 
studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. More specifically, this research deals with 
instrumental translation as defined by Nord (1991:72): “an instrumental translation can 
have the same or a similar or analogous function as the ST [source text]”. Translators 
working in the EU multilingual context elaborate texts that will be equally authentic and 
will become part of a legal instrument. The translator then assumes the role of a text 
producer of binding rules in the target language (Šarčević 1997 and 2010; Felici 
                                                            
6 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585 states: “By creating a Community of unlimited 
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation 
of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both 
their nationals and themselves”. 
7  Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health [1982] E.C.R. 3415, para. 19. 
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2010:98; Prieto Ramos 2011b:204). In other words, translators are expected to produce 
texts that are equal in legal effect.  
HYPOTHESIS 
My main hypotheses are as follows: 
o Multilingualism in law can be effective only if the legal subjects affected by a given 
legal instrument are guaranteed equality before the law in all language versions. 
o There are some areas of conflict between multilingualism and legal certainty. On the 
one hand, as a result of the direct applicability of EU regulations in the Member 
States and the doctrine of direct effect, individuals can derive rights from EU 
legislation directly while it can also directly impose obligations upon them. Legal 
certainty is ensured by the publication of legislation in all the language versions. On 
the other hand, translation that is not absolutely reliable poses a threat to the uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law, decreasing legal certainty.  
o The Court of Justice of the European Union plays a crucial role in having the last 
word on the interpretation of EU law (Article 267 TFEU). Although exact 
equivalence in all language versions is difficult to attain, the Court has resorted to 
different criteria to reconcile diverging language versions and to assure uniform 
interpretation of EU law.   
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PART I: MULTILINGUALISM IN THE EU 
1.  THE ORIGINS 
The European Union is a unique phenomenon. Such a close integration of a group of 
countries by peaceful means has not happened anywhere else in the world. This 
uniqueness has implications that are important when thinking about the EU of today. 
Nowadays, the EU has twenty-seven Member States and twenty-three official 
languages. Multilingualism is a defining feature of the EU and we must first understand 
its historical origins. 
After the Second World War Europe lay in ruins, the economic and humanitarian 
situation was dire and hunger was widespread. Most European nations were either 
struggling to re-establish their governments and economies or were under direct military 
occupation (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2004: 5). 
It was in this context that French leaders saw Franco-German integration as a way to 
become allies rather than military adversaries. The big step, though, came only in 1952 
with the implementation of the Schuman Plan inspired by the “father of European 
integration”, Jean Monnet, but promoted by French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. 
He proposed that France and Germany should place their coal and steel sectors under 
the control of a supranational authority. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Italy joined the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
Some years later, the foreign ministers of the six members met in Messina to plan 
further integration, leading to the signing of two treaties of Rome in 1957: The 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The EEC treaty committed the six to extraordinarily deep economic 
integration: in addition to forming a customs union, it promised free labour mobility, 
capital market integration and a range of common policies. The treaty also set up a 
series of supranational institutions such as the European Parliamentary Assembly 
(which became the European Parliament) and the European Court of Justice. (ibid: 11). 
It can be seen that at the beginning the integration was primarily an economic and 
political question. Linguistic integration was not a priority during the first stage; in fact, 
the ECSC treaty was drawn up only in French. However, the Treaties of Rome were 
drawn up in Dutch, French, German and Italian. At this stage of the integration process, 
the founding members considered how important it was that all languages be on equal 
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footing. If one or two languages had been chosen, the other countries would have felt 
badly represented, paving the way to further conflict. Since the philosophy behind the 
integration process was to stop confrontations among the peoples of Europe, the six 
nations did not hesitate before multilingualism. They consciously opted for preserving 
linguistic diversity in the belief that integration would be achieved as long as this 
diversity was respected. Member States gave up part of their sovereignty but kept this 
defining feature: linguistic diversity. 
 
2. LEGAL BASES 
The discussions about the language regime started at the beginning of 1958 in the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives. On 15th April 1958, the Councils of the EEC 
and the Euratom passed Regulation No. 1 determining the languages to be used by both 
Communities (Commission 2009:11). Negotiations were carried out in French and a 
group of expert linguists were in charge of the German, Italian and Dutch version of the 
Regulation.8 This regulation has been amended after each enlargement, incorporating 
the new official languages up to the current number of 23 (subject to increase depending 
on the next accessions.9 This regulation refers to written use of languages. No mention 
is made of oral communication.  
Article 1 of the regulation mentions “the official languages and the working 
languages of the institutions”. It makes no distinction between them. In addition, 
Article 4 envisages that “regulations and other documents of general application shall 
be drafted in the four official languages.” Therefore, when dealing with binding texts 
no text can prevail over another one and all language versions are authentic. 
Moreover, what is very important from this regulation is that Article 6 gives EU 
institutions some freedom as to the applicability of this language regime: “The 
institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the 
languages are to be used in specific cases.” 
 
                                                            
8 EEC Council: Regulation No. 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community, Official Journal 017 , 06/10/1958 p. 0385 – 0386. 
9 For acceding and candidate countries see: http://goo.gl/oepDU  
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Since the Treaty of Lisbon there are seven EU institutions and each of them has applied 
the language regime differently. 
 
3. EU INSTITUTIONS 
3.1. European Parliament (EP) 
The EP is elected directly by EU citizens every five years; therefore, members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) represent the people. The Parliament is one of the EU’s 
main law-making institutions, along with the Council of the European Union ('the 
Council'). 
As the most democratic institution, the EP firmly defends multilingualism. It has 
reaffirmed “its commitment to the equality of the official languages and the working 
languages of all the countries of the Union” 10 and considers it a cornerstone of the 
concept of a European Union, of its philosophy and of the political equality of its 
Member States.  It asserts that different languages are one of the characteristics of 
European civilization and culture and an important aspect of Europe's diversity and 
cultural wealth. 
The EP has also opposed any attempt to discriminate between the official and the 
working languages of the European Union and urges that citizens use their own 
language, both orally and in writing, in their communication with all European 
institutions. 
It has adopted its own Rules of Procedure11 pursuant to Article 232 (TFEU). One article 
is devoted to the question of languages: 
Rule 146: Languages 
1.    All documents of Parliament shall be drawn up in the official languages. 
2.    All Members shall have the right to speak in Parliament in the official 
language of their choice. Speeches delivered in one of the official languages 
shall be simultaneously interpreted into the other official languages and into any 
other language the Bureau may consider necessary. 
                                                            
10  European Parliament, Resolution on the use of the official languages in the institutions of the European 
Union, 20/02/1995, C 043, p. 0091, Article 1. 
11 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 7th parliamentary term, July 2012. 
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3.    Interpretation shall be provided in committee and delegation meetings from 
and into the official languages used and requested by the members and 
substitutes of that committee or delegation. 
4.    At committee and delegation meetings away from the usual places of work 
interpretation shall be provided from and into the languages of those members 
who have confirmed that they will attend the meeting. These arrangements may 
exceptionally be made more flexible where the members of the committee or 
delegation so agree. In the event of disagreement, the Bureau shall decide. 
The Parliament considers the possibility of having discrepancies between the different 
language versions and states that if after the result of a vote it is announced that there 
are discrepancies, “the President decides whether the result announced is valid pursuant 
to Rule 171.5. If he declares the result valid, he must decide which version is to be 
regarded as having been adopted. However, the original version cannot be taken as the 
official text as a general rule, since a situation may arise in which all the other 
languages differ from the original text.” 
Rule 147.1 envisages that in case interpreters or translators for an official language are 
not available in sufficient numbers derogations from rule 146 shall be permissible. 
The Parliament, in its resolution of 14 May 2003  on its 2004 estimates, stated its 
intention to develop the concept of ‘controlled multilingualism’  and called on the 
Bureau to submit practical proposals concerning a more effective use of resources, 
whilst  maintaining equality among languages.12 
3.1.1. Controlled full multilingualism 
The linguistic services offered by the European Parliament are managed according to 
the principles of “controlled full multilingualism”. Members have the right to use the 
official language of their choice, pursuant to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. The Code 
of Conduct makes it clear that resources to be devoted to multilingualism shall be 
controlled by means of management on the basis of users’ real needs, a measure to 
make users more aware of their responsibilities and to allow for more effective planning 
                                                            
12 Code of Conduct on multilingualism adopted by the Bureau, November 2008. 
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of requests for language facilities.13 Article 1 (5) provides that the services will be 
provided according to the needs: 
The management of language resources shall be based on a system providing for 
the exchange of information between users and the language services. Users 
shall determine and update their language needs by means of an ‘interpretation 
language profile’ and quarterly forecasts of translation requirements designed to 
facilitate medium- and long-term management of language resources. Users 
shall notify the language services of their real needs by the deadlines laid down 
in this Code of Conduct. The language services shall inform users of any 
shortage of resources. 
Another measure is that texts submitted for translation have maximum lengths (Article 
14 of the Code of Conduct). 
3.2.  European Council 
European Council meetings are essentially summits where EU leaders meet to decide on 
broad political priorities and major initiatives. Typically there are around four meetings 
a year chaired by a permanent president. The European Council brings together the 
heads of state or government of every EU country, the Commission president and the 
European Council president, who chairs the meetings. The EU’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also attends.  
The Treaty of Lisbon transformed the European Council into an institution of the 
European Union and it should therefore adopt its Rules of Procedure.14 
As happens in the case of the Parliament, the European Council deliberates and takes 
decisions only on the basis of documents and drafts drawn up in the languages provided 
for by the language rules in force.15 In addition, “any member of the European Council 
may oppose discussion where the texts of any proposed amendments are not drawn up 
in the languages referred to in paragraph 1 as he or she may specify”.16 
                                                            
13 Ibid. Article 1.2. 
14 European Council Decision adopting its Rules of Procedure, December 2009. 
15 Ibid, Article 9.1. 
16 Ibid, Article 9.2. 
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3.3. Council of the European Union 
The Council, jointly with the European Parliament, exercises legislative and budgetary 
functions. It carries out policy-making and has coordinating functions as laid down in 
the treaties (Art. 16 TEU).There are no fixed members as such. At each Council 
meeting, each country sends the minister for the policy field being discussed, e.g. the 
environment minister for a meeting dealing with environmental matters. 
Article 14 of the Council Decision adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure17states 
that: 
1. Except as otherwise decided unanimously by the Council on grounds of 
urgency, the Council shall deliberate and take decisions only on the basis of 
documents and drafts drawn up in the languages specified in the rules in 
force governing languages. 
That means that when ministers meet up, they should have the documents in language 
versions for the participants before the meeting. Moreover, “any member of the Council 
may oppose discussion if the texts of any proposed amendments are not drawn up in 
such of the languages referred to in paragraph 1 as he or she may specify (Article 
14.2).” 
However, when ministers have informal meetings they normally work with two or three 
languages: French, English and German, or French, German and the language of the 
country that has the presidency this term (Siguán 2004:6). 
At a lower level, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is 
responsible for preparing the work of the Council (Article 16.7 TEU), normally works 
in German, English and French (Fenet 2001:247). 
3.4.  European Commission 
The European Commission is the body that proposes legislation, implements EU policy 
and the budget, and makes sure the treaties are properly applied; it shares executive 
powers with the Council of the EU.18 It is composed of 27 commissioners (subject to 
change in 2014)19 chosen on the ground of their general competence and European 
                                                            
17 Council Decision adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, 11.12.2009, L 325/35. 
18 European Commission, Rules of Procedure, 8.12.2000, L 308/26. 
19 Article 17.5 TEU: 5. As of 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, 
including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
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commitment. Each commissioner is assigned responsibility for specific policy areas by 
the president. According to Article 249 TFEU “the Commission shall adopt its Rules of 
Procedure so as to ensure that both it and its departments operate. It shall ensure that 
these rules are published.” The rules consist of 29 articles and set out the institution's 
administrative organisation, its internal decision-making procedure, provisions for 
security and access to legal documents.  
Article 25 establishes that “the Commission shall, as necessary, lay down rules to make 
these Rules of Procedure effective. The Commission may adopt supplementary 
measures relating to the functioning of the Commission and of its departments which 
shall be annexed to these Rules of Procedure.” That means that the language choice may 
vary according to the situation. 
English, French and German are the main working languages20 of the European 
Commission (even if German is used far less than the other two) (Gazzola 2006:5). 
3.5.  Court of Justice of the European Union 
Regulation 1/58 establishes that the Court has a specific language regime: “The 
languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be laid down in its 
rules of procedure.” 
Chapter 6 of the Rules of Procedure21 (art. 29-31) is devoted to the language regime. 
First of all it is necessary to distinguish between working language and the language of 
a case. The working language is French and this is the language used by the members of 
the Court and the rest of personnel in their internal communications. The consequence 
is that procedural documents written in a language other than French are all translated 
into French for internal work purposes. 
The language of a case is the one used in the written and oral pleadings of the parties 
and in supporting documents as well as in the minutes and decisions of the Court 
(Article 29.3). Any supporting documents expressed in another language must be 
accompanied by a translation into the language of the case. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
corresponding to two thirds of the total number of Member States, unless the European Council acting 
unanimously decides to alter this number. 
20 The webpage on traineeship establishes that “the working languages of the European Commission are 
English, French and German.”  http://goo.gl/GN8yO 
21 Court of Justice of the European Union, consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure, 2.7.2010. 
C177/1. 
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The language of a case shall be chosen by the applicant, except:  
(a) where the defendant is a Member State or a natural or legal person having the 
nationality of a Member State, the language of the case shall be the official 
language of that State; where that State has more than one official language, the 
applicant may choose between them  
(b) at the joint request of the parties, the use of another language mentioned in 
paragraph 1 for all or part of the proceedings may be authorised  
(c) at the request of one of the parties and after the opposite party and the 
Advocate General have been heard, the use of another language mentioned in 
paragraph 1 as the language of the case for all or part of the proceedings may be 
authorised by way of derogation from subparagraphs (a) and (b); such a request 
may not be submitted by an institution of the European Communities.  
The language of the case is the only authentic version (Milian i Massana 1995:494). 
Subsequently, the judgement is translated into the other official languages. For 
preliminary rulings, the language shall be the one of the organ that poses the question to 
the Court. 
3.6. European Central Bank 
The European Central Bank (ECB, based in Frankfurt, Germany) manages the euro and 
safeguards price stability in the EU. The ECB is also responsible for framing and 
implementing the EU’s economic and monetary policy.  
The ECB has also become an institution since the Treaty of Lisbon. It also adopted its 
Rules of Procedure22 and the language question is mentioned in Article 17. 
Multilingualism is ensured by publication of the documents in all language versions: 
“[…] any ECB guideline that is to be officially published shall be translated into 
the official languages of the European Communities” (Article 17.2.). 
“[…] any ECB instruction that is to be officially published shall be translated 
into the official languages of the European Communities”. (Article 17.6.) 
Moreover, Article 17.7 states that the Executive Board shall take steps to ensure the 
publication in the case of ECB regulations, ECB opinions on draft Community 
                                                            
22 European Central Bank Decision adopting its Rules of Procedure, 18.03.2004, L 080/33. 
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legislation and those ECB legal instruments whose publication has been expressly 
decided in all the official languages of the European Communities in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 
Despite all this, the home page of the ECB is only available in English; some 
subsections are provided in the other official languages. A complaint was submitted to 
the Ombusdman23 regarding this issue and the ECB explained that the ECB develops its 
"multilingual communication" taking into account the recipients of the information. The 
ECB communicates with the European citizens and their representatives in their own 
languages whilst its communication with financial markets is made in English. It seems 
the ECB has opted for multilingualism ‘à la carte’, making a distinction between the lay 
people and the specialists.  
The ombudsman noted that the ECB has a dual structure: on the one hand, it is a 
specialised EU law organisation, and on the other, it is the decision-making centre of 
the European system of Central banks. Therefore, the Ombudsman understood that the 
language used by the ECB in its external contacts with the public through its website 
could reasonably differ depending on the nature of the information concerned. 
3.7. Court of Auditors 
The European Court of Auditors audits EU finances. Its role is to improve EU financial 
management and report on the use of public funds. It was set up in 1975 and is based in 
Luxembourg. Now Also an EU institution since the Treaty of Lisbon, the Court of 
Auditors adopted its own rules of procedure24. One article is devoted to the language 
question: 
Article 28 
Languages and authentication 
1. The reports, opinions, observations, statements of assurance and other 
documents, if for publication, shall be drawn up in all the official languages. 
2. The documents shall be authenticated by the apposition of the President's 
signature on all the language versions. 
                                                            
23 Case: 1008/2006/(BB)MHZ , Opened on 07 Jun 2006 - Decision on 31 Oct 2007. 
24 Court of Auditors of the European Union, Rules of Procedure, 23.04.2010, L 103/1. 
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Once again, multilingualism is guaranteed by publication in all official languages. All 
of the documents stemming from the Treaty, in particular the Annual Report, Special 
Reports, Special Annual Reports, Opinions, letters from the president and observations 
are translated into the Union's official languages. The same is true of documents 
forwarded officially to the European institutions and a number of other documents such 
as certain competition notices, vacancy notices, Court Decisions and staff notices. The 
same rule also applies to documents for general circulation, such as Court brochures, 
documents providing information on the Court's work and documents for internal use 
and circulation to the national audit institutions, such as the Audit Manual. The related 
translation work is entrusted to the Court's Translation Directorate, which consists of 
one language unit for each official language.25 
However, for internal purposes (Court, Chamber and Administrative Committee 
meetings), the European Court of Auditors has adopted "limited multilingualism" as a 
solution, i.e., using two key/drafting languages: English and French.  
 
4. OTHER BODIES 
Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 applies to the institutions. “The institutions of the 
Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be 
used in specific cases”. Therefore, other bodies and agencies are not subject to it. 
4.1.  European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
The EESC contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the European Union by enabling civil society organisations from the Member States to 
express their views at the European level.  
On 14 July 2009, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 
29(a) of Implementing Provisions of the Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an 
additional Opinion26on the EU's multilingualism policy. It stated that the 
multilingualism policy is part of the EESC's political priorities since it helps improve 
                                                            
25 See The European Court of Auditors' language policy: http://goo.gl/pUaqh 
26 European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on ‘The EU’s multilingualism policy’ (additional 
opinion), 15.2.2011, C 48/102. 
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the economy's competitiveness, achieve the Lisbon strategy goals and strengthen 
European integration through intercultural dialogue (‘unity in diversity’).27  
Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure28 mentions that “the number of meetings and working 
languages shall be decided by the bureau.” Moreover, Rule 64. 3. guarantees that “any 
citizen of the European Union may write to the Committee in one of the official 
languages and receive a reply written in the same language (in accordance with the 
fourth paragraph of Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
The main working languages of the EESC are English, French and German.29  
4.2. Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
The Committee of the Regions is also a consultative body of the EU established by the 
Treaty of Maastricht. It is made up of 350 members and an equal number of alternate 
members appointed for 5 years. The ommittee must be consulted as part of the 
European decision-making process in the following areas: economic and social 
cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health, education and culture, 
employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational training and transport. 
 Its Rules of Procedure30 devotes one article to interpreting matters: 
USE OF LANGUAGES 
Rule 76 — Interpreting arrangements 
The following principles shall as far as possible be observed in relation to 
interpreting arrangements: 
(a) The Committee’s debates shall be accessible in the official languages unless 
the Bureau decides otherwise. 
(b) All members shall have the right to address the plenary session in whichever 
official language they choose.  
Statements in one of the official languages shall be interpreted into the other 
official languages and any other language the Bureau considers necessary. 
                                                            
27 Ibid, Article 1.2. 
28 European Economic and Social Committee, Rules of Procedure, version adopted by the assembly July 
14, 2010. 
29 See the requirements for job applications: http://goo.gl/05KZQ 
30 Committee of the Regions, Rules of Procedure, 9.1.2010, L 6/14. 
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(c) At Bureau, commission and working party meetings, interpreting shall be 
available from and into the languages used by the members that have confirmed 
they will attend the meeting. 
The Committee of the Regions has defended multilingualism and linguistic diversity. In 
fact, its Rule 28 states that the Committee adopts the motto “United in Diversity”. 
From its Rules of Procedure, it seems that the Committee is open to work in different 
languages. However, the main working languages of the Committee of the Regions are 
English and French.31 
National delegations permit each individual member to receive information and 
assistance in his/her official language (Rule 8.2). As far as the agenda is concerned, 
Rule 15 establishes that “the draft agenda accompanied by all the documents requiring a 
decision listed therein shall be emailed by the president to the members and alternates in 
each respective official language at least 20 working days before the opening of the 
plenary session. Documents shall also be made accessible electronically at the same 
time”. 
4.3. Ombudsman  
The European Ombudsman investigates complaints about maladministration in the 
institutions and bodies of the European Union. 
If one is a citizen of a Member State of the Union or resides in a Member State, one can 
make a complaint to the European Ombudsman. Businesses, associations and other 
bodies with a registered office in the Union may also complain to the Ombudsman. 
Implementing provisions: 
Article 15: Languages 
15.1. A complaint may be submitted to the Ombudsman in any of the Treaty 
languages. The Ombudsman is not required to deal with complaints submitted in 
other languages. 
15.2. The language of proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman is one of the 
Treaty languages; in the case of a complaint, the language in which it is written. 
                                                            
31 See the requirements for job applications: http://goo.gl/uskcB 
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15.3. The Ombudsman determines which documents are to be drawn up in the 
language of the proceedings.32 
The main working languages of the European Ombudsman's office are English and 
French.33 
4.4. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) 
Ensuring equality of languages in the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
has been a controversial issue.  
Article 115 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/9434 provides that “the application for a 
Community trade mark shall be filed in one of the official languages of the European 
Community” (Art. 115.1). Nevertheless, the languages of the office are not all the 
languages but just English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. In addition, “the 
applicant must indicate a second language which shall be a language of the office the 
use of which he accepts as a possible language of proceedings for opposition, 
revocation or invalidity proceedings” (Art. 115.3). If the application is not in a 
“language of the Office”, it is translated into the second language indicated by the 
applicant and the Office may issue written communications in the second language even 
if that is not the language of the application.  
The legality of this provision was at the heart of the Kik case35. A Dutch applicant had 
indicated Dutch as the second language for the proceedings, though it was not a 
language of the office. The Office rejected the application for a trade mark and the 
applicant thought that the decision and the decision and the legal provision it was based 
on infringed on the equality of official languages and that this affected her position in 
the market as compared with those agents who could run the whole procedure in their 
mother tongue. Therefore, she contested the decision at the Court of First Instance of 
the EU and then appealed at the Court of Justice. 
The Courts dismissed the arguments of the applicant and considered them unfounded. 
The Court of Justice declared that although the Treaty of Rome had several references 
to the use of various languages, these “cannot be regarded as evidencing a general 
                                                            
32 European Ombudsman, Implementing provisions: http://goo.gl/0j5Cp 
33 See requirements to apply for a traineeship: http://goo.gl/ZjdBS 
34 Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, 14.01.94, No. 
L 11/01, Article 115. 
35 Case T-120/99, Christina Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2001] E.C.R. II 2235, 
and C-361/01 P Christina Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2003] E.C.R. I 8283. 
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principle of Community law that confers a right of every citizen to have a version of 
anything that might affect his interests drawn up in his language in all circumstances”.36 
Furthermore, Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 applies to the institutions and the OHIM is 
not an institution. 
The importance of the Kik judgements is that the idea of a constitutional principle of 
language equality was disregarded; thereby, differentiated language regimes are created 
for the various EU agencies though not for the institutions. 
The official and working languages in the EU institutions and other bodies can be 
summarized as follows: 
EU INSTITUTIONS Official languages Main working languages 
European Parliament 
All 23 official languages 
(Article 6 Regulation 1/58)
All 23 official languages  
European Council All 23 official languages  
Council of the European 
Union 
All 23 official languages 
Informal meetings & 
COREPER: English, French, 
German 
European Commission English, French, German 
Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
French 
European Central Bank English 
Court of Auditors English and French 
OTHER BODIES Official languages Main working languages 
European Economic and 
Social Committee 
All 23 official languages  English, French, German 
Committee of the Regions All 23 official languages  English and French  
Ombudsman All 23 official languages  English and French  
                                                            
36 Para. 32 of the ruling in C-361/01 P. 
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Office for Harmonisation in 
the Internal Market 
English, French, German, 
Italian and Spanish 
(languages of the Office) 
 
But all 23 official 
languages to file 
application for a trade 
mark  
English, French, German, Italian 
and Spanish (languages of the 
Office) 
 
5. THE CONTESTED MULTILINGUAL SYSTEM IN THE EU 
The sustainability of the current language regime in the EU has been challenged by 
some scholars. Radical views against multilingualism are, for example, those of 
Philippe Van Parijs (2007) and Abram de Swaan (2001, 2004, 2007). Van Parijs is very 
confident that we should all be using English as the lingua franca for the purposes of 
efficiency and fairness. Abram de Swaan goes beyond that and has even stated that 
multilingualism is a “damned nuisance”37and affirms that “the more languages that 
compete, the more English will take hold”. 
Let us examine some of the main arguments against multilingualism in the EU: 
Language is an obstacle in the EU and communication would be better if we spoke a 
single language. 
After the great enlargement in 2004 the language regime started to be viewed as a 
hindrance for the EU. “The intellectual exchange is hampered by the barriers of 
language and by the constraints of the national framework” (De Swaan 2007:9). This 
author affirms that the coexistence of all official languages is an obstacle to cultural 
opportunities.38 Van Parijs, on his part, states that “we need a way of communicating 
directly and intensively across the borders drawn by the differences of our mother 
tongues, without the extremely expensive and constraining mediation of competent 
interpreters (Van Parijs 2004:219). 
                                                            
37 http://euobserver.com/9/26742 
38 This inadequate cultural opportunity structure is coupled with a most persistent cultural obstacle 
structure: the coexistence of a dozen languages within the European Union. (De Swaan 2007:5) 
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It is commonly agreed that if we have to use a single language it would be English. 
“The lingua franca is inevitably English, as carrier of globalization, imperialism, 
capitalism, consumerism and commercialization” (De Swaan 2001:153).  English has 
become the predominant medium of international communication in the EU. When 
mentioning globalisation, Van Parijs states that we need a single language “in particular 
if we do not want Europeanisation, and beyond it globalisation, to be the exclusive 
preserve of the wealthy and the powerful who can afford quality interpretation 
(2004:219). 
However, at a closer analysis, these arguments seem to be unsustainable. First, the use 
of a single official language, most probably English, would imply moving backwards in 
the process of European integration. I shall analyse in section 6 that there are strong 
legal and political arguments that justify multilingualism. Moreover, if we do not want 
globalisation to be exclusively for those who can afford quality interpretation, then we 
should think about the cost of learning English. It could be argued that only the wealthy 
and the privileged can afford to learn English as a foreign language. Besides, what about 
those who do not have the gift of readily learning languages?39 The only way of 
achieving monolingualism in the EU would be through linguistic imperialism, by 
imposing a single language on the peoples of Europe, which seems far-fetched.  
Van Parijs reiterates that “we definitely need convergence to a single lingua franca. 
Those saddened by the fact that it is not the one they learned as infants will have to 
come to terms with it. Their narcissism should not jeopardise the satisfaction of our 
urgent communicative needs, in Europe and in the world” (Van Parijs 2004:224). The 
argument has been simplified to “come to terms with it”! He has even expressed the joy 
of being in a situation of monolingualism: “if a powerful language were to drive all 
others into gradual extinction, not only would we all enjoy the convenience of being 
able to use our mother tongue in all the conference rooms and hotel lobbies of the 
world, but incomparably more would be within our reach” (Van Parijs 2007:12). De 
Swaan also stated “there is no good reason why people should not switch to another, 
more viable language” (De Swaan 2001:188).  
From these arguments we see a contradiction that is quite worrying. On the one hand, 
these authors endorse the use of a lingua franca but they seem not to take into account 
                                                            
39 De Swaan has even recognized that “not everyone is endowed with the gift in which linguists take such 
pride” (2004:8) 
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the consequences of losing a language. By switching to a more viable language the use 
of other languages would be at risk. De Swaan has even recognised that the 
disappearance of a language “is an irreversible loss of culture. A language is a piece of 
cultural heritage comparable to the Egyptian pyramids or to medieval cathedrals, to 
African polyrhythm or European polyphony” (De Swaan 2004:3). So why would we 
want to put languages in danger? 
Seize English! 
De Swaan was involved in a debate on multilingualism in Europe and some of the 
arguments given in favour of a lingua franca are worth examining. He stated that we 
should seize the English language and dispossess the Anglo-Saxons of the monopoly od 
distinction: 
De Swaan: je rejoins là Pierre Bourdieu – s’approprient l’anglais comme langue 
européenne et qu’ils dépossèdent les Anglo-Saxons du monopole de la 
distinction, du bon et mauvais usage, de la bonne et mauvaise prononciation, 
comme les Indiens et les Nigérians sont finalement en train de s’approprier 
l’anglais dans leur propre version, au lieu d’être gênés de ne pas parler un bon 
anglais (Bourdieu et al 2001). 
This argument seems to be illusory; only a tyrant can take this measure. In the debate, 
Claude Hagège argued against de Swaan’s proposal stating it is utopian, unfair and even 
extremely dangerous.40 As Flesh stated, « Si l’Europe s’uniformise sous une langue ou 
une culture “dominante”, elle perdra son âme” (Flesh 1999: 99). 
Professor Bruno de Witte makes an interesting analysis on the current linguistic 
situation and compares the adoption of a single language with the adoption of a single 
currency. He recognises the adoption of a single language would be inconceivable and 
states the change could take at least two generations (2004: 205-241). The adoption of a 
common language is implausible because each language has a history; each language 
shows the way in which people see the world from different perspectives. A currency is 
something invented, the Euro was created to have an economic and monetary union. It 
                                                            
40 « Le point de vue qui a été ici développé consiste à dire qu’il nous faut précéder les anglophones, 
Américains comme Britanniques, en les dépossédant de leurs privilèges, de leur usage autochtone de la 
langue, pour devenir nous-mêmes de parfaits anglophones. Cela me paraît totalement utopique et injuste, 
voire extrêmement dangereux. » 
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is subject to the ups and downs of the global economy and its existance may be at risk, 
depending on the financial markets. 
The cost of multilingualism 
De Swaan has also stated that “one argument against the use of multiplicity of 
languages and in favour of a single vehicular language meets broad agreement in all 
multilingual constellations: the costs of translation and interpretation from and into all 
recognized languages are prohibitive” (De Swaan 2001:191).  
Those expecting an exorbitant expenditure will be surprised by the small percentage the 
cost of multilingualism represents in the EU overall budget. In 1999, the Joint 
Interpreting and Conference Service estimated that the cost for translation and 
interpretation including all EU institutions was 0.8% of the total EU budget41 (€686 
million out of a total of € 85,557,748,703).42 From this the press office of the language 
service of the Commission concludes that multilingualism costs each citizen of the EU 
just €2 per year (Kraus 2008:123). Moreover, according to one of the studies published 
by the European Commission in 2009, the cost of multilingualism is about 1% of the 
EU budget: 
Tous coûts des services linguistiques inclus. La traduction et l'interprétation 
coûtent environ 1 milliard d'euros par an, ce qui est moins de 1% du budget de 
l'EU. Pour mémoire, le budget de l'UE représente 1% du PIB agrégé des 27 Etats 
membres (European Commission-DGT). 
Leonard Orban, former commissioner for multilingualism, declared in an interview 
given to EurActiv in 2008 that "if we divide [the €1.1bn] by population, we see that it is 
about €2.5 per citizen per year”.43 
Therefore, the cost of multilingualism turns out to be a weak argument. The European 
Parliament has clearly stated that “technical and budgetary arguments can in no 
circumstances justify a reduction in the number of languages”.44 
                                                            
 
42 Source: European Commission. Joint Interpreting and Conference Service, 2001: Info/Web/Media – 6 
March 2001 (internal fact sheet), cited in Kraus 2008, p.123. 
43 http://goo.gl/mgL9n 
44 Resolution on the use of the official languages in the institutions of the European Union, 20.02.1995, C 
043. p. 0091. 
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In relation to this issue, the author Stéphane Lopez claimed that “Le coût du 
plurilinguisme est le pire des arguments. Chacun a compris que au global la chiffre qui 
passe le milliard d’euros est impressionnante mais que rapporté au nombre de citoyens, 
il parait comme ridicule, entre deux et trois euros par an” (2007:13). 
 
6. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THIS MULTILINGUAL ORGANISATION 
The special legal nature of the EU differentiates it from an international organisation 
and justifies multilingualism. The EU is not simply a cooperation body like other 
organisations; it has supranational competences. That means Member States have 
voluntarily handed over part of their sovereignty and the EU has the capacity to legislate 
under the principle of subsidiarity. According to Article 5 TEU, in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the EU shall take action in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better 
achieved by the EU (see De Lange et al 2007:39). 
6.1.  POLITICAL REASONS 
Multilingualism guarantees democratic accountability and public access to EU 
legislation. “Any approach that failed to respect the languages of the peoples of the 
union would betray the very foundations of Union philosophy” (European Commission 
1999:4). As the Commission stated in one of its studies, “La diversité linguistique est 
mieux prise en compte au plan européen, comme base fondatrice de la démocratie et 
facteur d’adhésion des citoyens à la construction européenne.”  
The Member States are committed to the principle of democracy (Article 2 TEU and 
Article 9 to 12 TEU). The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative 
democracy. The Union aimed at creating a more democratic process of integration, 
which began in the seventies when the Act of 20 September 197645 was passed. 
European integration is based on the people’s willingness and cannot be sustainable 
without the support of public opinion. The measure one of making each language 
official was a wise decision because it shows that European integration is a collective 
task and that each Member State can contribute to it. 
                                                            
45 Act of 20 September 1976, 08.10.1976, OJEC L 278.  
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Member States decided to preserve linguistic diversity and many think that if they 
renounce their language their cultural identity is in danger. Clear examples of this 
tendency to preserve linguistic diversity are Austria, Malta and Ireland. 
When Austria acceded the EU, it asked for the recognition of 23 Austrian terms which 
were set in Protocol No. 10, regarding the use of specific Austrian terms:  “In the 
German language version of new legal acts the specific Austrian terms mentioned in the 
annex to this Protocol shall be added in appropriate form to the corresponding terms 
used in Germany”.46 
Malta opted to preserve Maltese although English is an official language there. 
A temporary derogation from the obligation to draft acts in Maltese and to publish them 
in the Official Journal of the European Union was adopted by the Council on 1 May 
2004. This derogation was to be applied for a period of three years, extendable for one 
further year, to all acts with the exception of regulations adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council.47 The Council decided to stop this derogation in 
2007 after the first period of three years. 
Ireland, for its part, fought for the recognition of Irish, although at the beginning they 
had renounced its official status. On 1 January 2007, Irish became a full EU official 
language, with a temporary derogation for a renewable period of five years48 stating that 
‘the institutions of the European Union shall not be bound by the obligation to draft all 
acts in Irish and to publish them in that language in the Official Journal of the European 
Union’, except for regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the 
Council. This derogation has been extended for a period of five years (until 31 
December 2016) by Council Regulation (EU) No 1257/2010.49  
 
                                                            
46 Annex 5, Protocol no. 10 of the Treaty of Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden to the 
European Union. 
47 see Council Regulation (EC) No 930/2004, 1.5.2004, L 169 , p. 1 
48 see Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005, 18.6.2005,  L 156, p. 3. 
49 Council Regulation (EU) No 1257/2010, 29.12.2010, L 343, p. 5. 
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6.2. LEGAL REASONS 
6.2.1.  Direct Effect 
This principle was enshrined by the Court of Justice in the judgement Van Gend en 
Loos.50 The case arose from the reclassification of a chemical, by the Benelux countries, 
into a customs category entailing higher customs charges. The broad definition derived 
from this judgement can be expressed as the capacity of a provision of EU law to be 
invoked before a national court. The narrower classical definition of direct effect is 
usually expressed in terms of the capacity of a provision of EU law to confer rights on 
individuals which they may enforce before national courts (Craig and De Búrca 2011: 
182). 
In Van Gend en Loos one of the questions posed to the Court was whether Article 12 
of the EEC Treaty had direct application in national law in the sense that nationals of 
Member States may on the basis of this Article lay claim to rights which national 
courts must protect. The Court ruled that to decide whether Article 12 had direct 
effect it was “necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of 
those provisions”. The Court examined the preamble to the Treaty which referred not 
only to governments but to peoples and concluded the object of the EEC treaty, which 
is to establish a common market, meant that this treaty did more than create mutual 
obligations between the contracting states. The objective of the Treaty was also 
confirmed by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the 
exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens.51 The criteria used for 
interpretation were teleological, i.e., the Court took into account the purposes of the 
provisions and was not limited to the literal wording of Article 12 itself. 
In addition, the Court considered its role to be that of securing uniform interpretation 
of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals under article 177 of the EEC Treaty 
(now 267 TFEU) and said that this confirmed that “the states have acknowledged that 
community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those 
courts and tribunals”. 
The Court finally stated that “the conclusion to be drawn from this is that the 
community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which 
                                                            
50 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] E.C.R. 13. 
51 Ibid, On the substance of the case, page 12.  
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the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, the subjects 
of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals”. It decided that 
“independently of the legislation of the Member states, Community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights which become part of their legal heritage”52.  
The Court formulated that Article 12 met the criteria to produce direct effect since it 
was clear, negative, unconditional, contained no reservation on the part of the Member 
States, and was not dependent on any national implementing measure: 
The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which 
is not a positive but a negative obligation. This obligation, moreover, is not 
qualified by any reservation on the part of states which would make its 
implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure enacted under 
national law. The very nature of this prohibition makes it ideally adapted to 
produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member States and their 
subjects. 
The implementation of Article 12 does not require any legislative intervention 
on the part of the states. The fact that under this article it is the Member States 
who are made the subject of negative obligation does not imply that their 
nationals cannot benefit from this obligation. 
The doctrine of direct effect has been shaped by other judgements and “applies in 
principle to all binding EU law including the Treaties, secondary legislation, and 
international agreements” (Craig and de Búrca, 2011:180). Article 288 TFEU makes it 
clear that regulations shall have general application, are binding in their entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. Similarly, decisions shall be binding in their 
entirety and a decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding 
only on them. However, “a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods”. 
Therefore, the direct effect of directives is more controversial because they are 
instruments of indirect law-making. A directive represents only the first stage in a 
legislative operation; it does not create Community norms applicable as such but 
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imposes an obligation of result to be attained by the Member States, through amending 
or supplementing the relevant national provisions, in the manner appropriate to their 
respective legal orders (Dashwood 2006:84). 
DIRECT EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES 
The first case that dealt with this issue was Van Duyn53 in 1974. Ms. Van Duyn, a Dutch 
national, had been refused entry to the United Kingdom where she was to take up a 
secretarial post with the Church of Scientology, whose activities were considered 
harmful by the British authorities. In contesting her exclusion, Ms. Van Duyn sought to 
rely upon a provision of the then Directive 64/221, limiting the scope of national 
authorities' power to restrict the free movement of workers from another Member State 
on public policy grounds. 
The Court of Justice held that the relevant provision conferred on Ms. Van Duyn was an 
enforceable right. The following reasons were given by the Court for recognising that 
Directive 64/221 was capable of having direct effect: 
If, however, by virtue of the provisions of [Article 249] regulations are directly 
applicable and, consequently, may by their very nature have direct effects, it 
does not follow from this that other categories of acts mentioned in that Article 
can never have similar effects. 
The Court reminded that directives are binding and that “the useful effect of such an act 
would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their 
national courts”. It can thus be concluded that individuals may invoke a provision of a 
directive before their national courts.  
The Court further developed the doctrine of direct effect in Ratti54. Mr. Ratti, a 
manufacturer of solvents, was able to resist a criminal prosecution for not labelling his 
products in accordance with the applicable national standards, because he had complied 
with the requirements of a Community directive which Italy had failed to implement.  
The development in Ratti was that the Court stated that “a Member State which has not 
adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the prescribed periods 
                                                            
53 Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] E.C.R. 1337. 
54 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti [1979] E.C.R. 1629. 
 
Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil? 
28 
 
may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations which 
the directive entails.”  
VERTICAL DIRECT EFFECT 
The Marshall judgement in 1986 was also an important step with regard to the direct 
effect doctrine. Miss M. H. Marshall was employed by South West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority from June 1966 to 31 March 1980. From 23 May 1974 she worked 
under a contract of employment as senior dietician. On 31 March 1980, that is to say 
approximately four weeks after she had attained the age of 62, she was dismissed, 
although she had expressed her willingness to continue in the employment until she 
reached the age of 65. According to the order for reference, the sole reason for the 
dismissal was the fact that the appellant was a woman who had passed the retirement 
age applied by this health authority to women.  
In this preliminary ruling the first question the Court was asked was whether it could be 
considered that the principle of equality of treatment laid down by Directive No. 76/207 
had been infringed. The Court answered in the affirmative in that the cause for her 
dismissal constituted discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to that directive. The 
second question was whether Article 5 (1) of Directive No. 76/207 may be relied upon 
by an individual before national courts and tribunals.  
The Court stated that directives can only have vertical direct effect, i.e, in a relationship 
between an individual and the State, since the binding nature of a directive exists only 
in relation to “each Member State to which it is addressed”: 
With regard to the argument that a directive may not be relied upon against an 
individual, it must be emphasized that according to Article 189 of the EEC 
Treaty the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the 
possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only in 
relation to 'each Member State to which it is addressed'. It follows that a 
directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a 
provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person. It 
must therefore be examined whether, in this case, the respondent must be 
regarded as having acted as an individual.55 
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Then it was concluded that the respondent, Southampton and South West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority (Teaching), was a public authority. The ECJ has given an 
expansive interpretation to the concept of the state for the purposes of vertical direct 
effect. 
In Faccini Dori56 the possibility of relying on a directive in proceedings between a 
trader and a consumer was discussed. The problem was that the Member State (Italy) 
had not taken any steps to transpose the Directive into national law, although the period 
set for transposition had expired. The Francovich principle was used by Ms Dori who 
relied on the Directive to withdraw from an English language course. The Directive 
allowed consumers to cancel contracts within seven days if the contract had been made 
away from business premises - in this case at railway station. Mss Dori could not rely 
on the Directive against a private body but that she should be able to gain compensation 
from the Italian state. 
The Court repeated its ruling from Marshall stating that “a directive cannot of itself 
impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against 
an individual”: 
The effect of extending that case-law to the sphere of relations between 
individuals would be to recognize a power in the Community to enact 
obligations for individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to 
do so only where it is empowered to adopt regulations.57 
It follows that, in the absence of measures transposing the directive within the 
prescribed time-limit, consumers cannot derive from the directive itself a right of 
cancellation as against traders with whom they have concluded a contract or 
enforce such a right in a national court.58 
In Foster59 the Court faced a similar situation as in Marshall. It restated that a Member 
State which has not transposed the measures provided by the directive cannot claim 
against the individual “its own failure to perform the obligations which the directive 
                                                            
56 Case 91/92 Faccini Dori v. Recreb [1994] E.C.R. I-3325. 
57 Ibid, para. 24. 
58 Ibid, para. 25. 
59 Case 188/89 Foster v. British Gas plc [1990] E.C.R. I-3313. 
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entails”.60 So the State cannot take “advantage of his failure to comply with Community 
law”. 61 
In addition, in Foster the notion of State was also discussed. As happened in Marshall, 
the Court adopted a wide interpretation of the notion of State for the purposes of vertical 
direct effect: 
Article 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions may be relied upon in a claim for damages against a body, whatever 
its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted 
by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has 
for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between individuals.62 
 
''TRIANGULAR” DIRECT EFFECT 
The Court of Justice of the EU has made it clear that vertical direct effect is not 
precluded even if the application of the directive against the Member State will have 
adverse consequences for the individual. This is known as the triangular situation. 
The Wells case63 was a clear situation in which an individual was challenging the 
validity of a national measure on the ground that it conflicts with an obligation imposed 
on the Member State concerned by a directive but the consequence of this would imply 
that another individual would stop enjoying a right under national law. 
To be more precise, the owners of a quarry in Wales which had been dormant for many 
years were granted permission to recommence mining operations. Ms. Wells sought to 
have the permission revoked or modified on the ground that it had been given without 
due consideration as to whether an environmental impact assessment, as provided for by 
Directive 85/337. 
                                                            
60 Ibid, para. 16. 
61 Ibid, para. 17. 
62 Ibid, resolution of the Court. 
63 Case 201/02 Wells v. Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] 
E.C.R. I-723. 
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The United Kingdom claimed that accepting that an individual is entitled to invoke an 
article of the directive “would amount to 'inverse direct effect' directly obliging the 
Member State concerned, at the request of an individual, such as Ms. Wells, to deprive 
another individual or individuals, such as the owners of Conygar Quarry, of their 
rights”.64 
The Court rejected this argument and immediately stated that “mere adverse 
repercussions on the rights of third parties, even if the repercussions are certain, do not 
justify preventing an individual from invoking the provisions of a directive against the 
Member State concerned”. So Ms. Wells was held to be entitled to rely upon the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, in spite of the 'adverse repercussions' that 
would be suffered by the quarry owners. 
INDIRECT EFFECT 
The Court has developed a number of “doctrinal devices” that have reduced the impact 
of there not being horizontal direct effect of directives (Craig and de Búrca, 2011:200). 
Although the Court denied the possibility of direct horizontal effect, other ways of 
encouraging the effectiveness of directives were found, for instance, by developing a 
principle of harmonious interpretation which requires national law to be interpreted in 
the light of directives.  
In Von Colson65, the Court dealt with a directive that had been inadequately 
implemented and the case was brought against a state employer. 
The case revolved around the interpretation of Council Directive No. 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training, promotion and working 
conditions. 
The Court did not hesitate to confirm that Member States were obliged to achieve the 
result envisaged by the directive in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty to take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that 
obligation. Additionally, the Court reminded that “national courts are required to 
                                                            
64 Ibid, para. 55. 
65 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891. 
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interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive”.66 
Marleasing67 concerned a horizontal situation involving disputes between private 
parties before a domestic court, where the interpretation of national law in the light of 
an unimplemented directive would not impose a penal liability but was likely to affect 
its legal position in a disadvantageous way. The judgement confirmed that an 
unimplemented directive could be relied on to influence the interpretation of national 
law in a case between individuals (Craig and De Búrca 2011: 201). 
So the Court of Justice emphasized the national court's duty of consistent interpretation: 
“[…] in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted 
before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is 
required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose 
of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby 
comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty68. 
All these cases of indirect effect turn out to be really important for our study since the 
criteria of interpretation of the Court can be elucidated. The duty of harmonious 
interpretation became a very important criterion of interpretation for the Court, as well 
as the need to interpret a provision in accordance to the general scheme and the rules of 
which it forms a part. 
The hermeneutical principles become important not only when dealing with linguistic 
divergences but also when interpreting EU in general, when EU principles are defined 
with the case-law. 
6.2.2. Supremacy of EU Law 
The doctrine of supremacy of EU law had no formal basis in the Treaty, but was 
developed by the ECJ on the basis of its conception of the “new legal order” (Craig and 
de Búrca, 2011:256).   
In Van Gend en Loos the Court stated that the Community constituted a new legal order 
of international law for the benefit of which the states had limited their sovereign rights 
                                                            
66 Ibid, para 26. 
67 Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] E.C.R. I-135. 
68 Ibid, para 8. 
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but the ECJ’s primary focus was on direct effect. The Court firmly established the 
supremacy of Community law in Costa v. ENEL.69 
In this case Mr. Costa, a shareholder of a private electricity company in Italy, saw 
himself affected by the nationalisation of the production and distribution of electric 
energy (the organisation ENEL was created to manage electricity). He refused to pay an 
electricity bill sent to him by ENEL as he objected to the nationalisation of the 
electricity industry. ENEL sued him; in his defence he pleaded that the nationalisation 
was both unconstitutional under Italian law and in breach of community law. 
One of the important issues in this judgement was the interaction between national and 
Community law. The Court stated that where two sets of rules, national and community, 
can apply to a situation one must take precedence. The question was which one 
prevailed and who decided. The problem also arose of the effect of national laws which 
came into effect after the Treaty and which conflicted with it. The Court stated that the 
EEC Treaty had created its own legal system which became an integral part of the legal 
system of Member States when the Treaty came into force. The national courts were 
bound to enforce this legal system: 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its 
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves.70 
The Court considered that the law stemming from the Treaty was an independent source 
of law and could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by 
domestic legal provisions. To do this would be to deprive Community law of its 
character and call into question the legal functions of the Community. Article 177 was 
to be applied regardless of any domestic law. 
The Court’s view on the supremacy of Community law was extended in other cases 
such as Internationale Handelsgeselschaft and Simmenthal. 
                                                            
69 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585. 
70 Ibid, on the application of Article 177, page 593. 
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In Internationale Handelsgeselschaft71 the Verwantlungsgericht Frankfurt-am-Main 
(administrative court) referred to the Court two questions on the validity of a system of 
export licenses and deposits established by a Council regulation on the common 
organisation of the market of cereals and a Commission regulation on import and export 
licenses. The referring court took the view that the contested measures were 
incompatible with certain fundamental principles contained in the German Constitution 
which had to be protected within the framework of the Community. The national 
provisions in dispute were adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty. Moreover, 
they had constitutional status. By contrast, the rules of Community law at issue were 
contained, not only in the Treaty itself, but in acts of the Community institutions. The 
Court, however, stated that Community law takes primacy over the Constitutions of 
member states: 
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the 
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the community would have an 
adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of community law. The validity of 
such measures can only be judged in the light of community law. In fact, the law 
stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its 
very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however framed, without 
being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of 
the community itself being called in question. Therefore, the validity of a 
community measure or its effect within a member state cannot be affected by 
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the 
constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure.72  
In Simmenthal73 the Court further developed its supremacy doctrine by making clear 
that the supremacy of EU law applied irrespective of whether the national law pre-dated 
or post-dated the EU law. 
Simmenthal S.p.A. was a company that imported beef for human consumption from 
France and was charged for an inspection on imported beef. Simmenthal was of the 
opinion that the veterinary and public health inspections of the beef when it crossed the 
frontier and the fees charged for such inspections were obstacles to the free movement 
of goods and as such forbidden under Community law. In Simmenthal the question 
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arose whether a national court had the power to refuse the application of conflicting 
provisions of national law in favour of Community law. The Court decided that every 
national court was obliged to apply Community law, and if necessary, to refuse the 
application of conflicting national law: 
This principle of the precedence of Community law does not spring from the 
various constitutions of the Member States, which would involve clear danger 
that the solutions would vary according to the wording of those constitutions, but 
from Community law itself. The principles of the precedence and of the direct 
effect of Community law imply that inconsistent national laws can ipso jure not 
be set up against it without its being necessary to await their repeal by the 
national legislature or their annulment by a constitutional court. 
Community provisions having direct effect cannot be affected by conflicting 
national legislative provisions, whether prior or subsequent to them.74  
6.2.3. Legal Certainty 
Legal certainty is one of a number of general principles recognised by EU law.75 The 
concept is applied in a number of ways (Craig and De Búrca 2011:533). 
The principle of legal certainty expresses the fundamental premise that those subject to 
the law must know what the law is so as to be able to plan their actions accordingly.  In 
Black Clawson Ltd v. Papierwerke AG, Lord Diplock the Court stated that the 
acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before 
committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what the 
legal consequences that will flow from it are. In some ways, legal certainty is even more 
important than equality (Tridimas 2006:242). 
What does legal certainty mean in EU law? 
As Craig and de Búrca point out, the concept of legal certainty is found in many legal 
systems, although their content may vary (2011:533). We consider it necessary to 
analyse it from the perspective of the EU as a multilingual legal system. In that line, Dr. 
Paunio considers legal certainty as a two-dimensional concept consisting of both formal 
(predictability) and substantive elements (acceptability) (2011:1). She explains that 
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formal legal certainty implies that laws and adjudication in particular must be 
predictable: laws must satisfy requirements of clarity, stability and intelligibility so that 
those concerned can with relative accuracy calculate the legal consequences of their 
actions as well as the outcome of legal proceedings (Paunio 1995:1469). Substantive 
legal certainty implies that laws be accepted by the legal community in question. It is 
necessary to analyse whether this twofold conception of legal certainty be applied in the 
context of the EU. The focus of this study is on legal certainty as an underlying 
principle expressing the fundamental rationality of the EU legal order (idem: 1470). 
Substantive legal certainty may be enhanced by emphasizing the communicative 
relationship between the Court and the EU legal community. On this view, transparent 
argumentation is a key to a more open dialogue. In the EU legal certainty cannot be 
reduced to predictability. “The focus should shift to the Court’s reasoning: this is 
essential for the acceptance of judgements through which interpretative choices are 
communicated to the legal community” (idem: 1490). Paunio proposes the conception 
of communicative legal certainty making emphasis on the acceptability of judicial 
decision-making within a particular legal community (2011:5). The argumentation of 
the Court must include a certain reflexivity that takes into account the differing legal 
cultures, traditions that underlie the pluralistic EU legal community. In this sense, the 
dialectical relationship between the Court and its audience constitutes a forum where 
different normative views meet. 
Moreover, I agree with Paunio in that a new conception of legal certainty is needed in 
which purpose, telos, and other dynamic methods of interpretation are of particular 
significance for the construction of meaning in multilingual EU law (2011:3). In this 
respect, teleological interpretation is highly important for the Court of Justice and legal 
certainty can be conceptualized within the context of EU law from the point of view of 
the legal reasoning by the Court of Justice of the EU. 
Publication of EU legislation 
As a result of the direct applicability of EU regulations in the Member States and the 
doctrine of direct effect, individuals can derive rights from EU legislation directly while 
it can also directly impose obligations upon them. Legal certainty is ensured by the 
publication of the legislation in the Official Journal of the EU (Milian i Massana 
1995:497, 2010:113).   
Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil? 
37 
 
In the Skoma-Lux case, which concerned the legal effect of EU legislation in the event 
that one of the language versions was not published in the Official Journal, the ECJ 
held: 
The principle of legal certainty requires that Community legislation must allow 
those concerned to acquaint themselves with the precise extent of the obligations 
it imposes upon them, which may be guaranteed only by the proper publication 
of that legislation in the official language of those to whom it applies.76 
The Court makes it clear that the principle of legal certainty requires official 
publication; unofficial forms of publication, for example on websites, are not sufficient. 
This follows inter alia from Regulation 1/58. Secondly, only if a legal instrument has 
been published in the official language of a Member State can it be enforced against 
individuals in that Member State. 
 
7. THE PARADOX OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND MULTILINGUALISM IN 
THE EU 
As I have argued before, the fact that EU law produces rights and obligations for 
individuals justifies the rendering of the texts in all the official languages. 
Multilingualism in the EU is then necessary because citizens need to have access to the 
EU legislation in their own language (Dengler 2010:97; Felici 2010:95; Wagner 
2001:67; Wouter 2010:43); otherwise, legal certainty could be at risk (Athanassiou 
2006:7) because those subject to the law must know what the law is so as to be able to 
plan their actions accordingly (Tridimas 2006:242). In addition, the principle of 
linguistic equality requires texts of general applicability to be drafted and published in 
all official languages and gives all these texts equal status for the purpose of 
interpretation (Wouter 2006:43). 
However, there are some areas of conflict between legal certainty and multilingualism 
which show that the current language regime is not perfect and a paradox comes to light 
regarding legal certainty. Legal certainty requires that “Community legislation must be 
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clear and precise and its application foreseeable by individuals”.77 But can rules carry 
identical legal implication in twenty-three languages?  
Exact equivalence between twenty-three language versions of a legal text is difficult to 
attain (Wouter 2006:43) and some degree of divergence between the language texts is 
inevitable (Kuner 1991:958) because each language possesses its own genius, which 
influences the choice of words (ibid: 369). Pescatore also stated that “les décalages 
linuistiques sont inevitable dans un processus legislative multipartite” (1984:1008). “It 
goes without saying that a translation that is not absolutely reliable poses a threat to the 
uniform interpretation and application of Community law” (Sarcervic 2001:318). We 
can therefore think that multilingualism adds to uncertainty in law. 
In case of doubt, the Court of Justice of the EU is responsible for interpreting EU 
legislation (Article 267 TFEU) based on the premise that no language version prevails 
over the others and it is necessary to interpret them uniformly, i.e., in the light of the 
versions existing in the other languages.78 In addition, “the real intention of its author 
and the aim he seeks to achieve” must also be taken into account.79 In this way, the 
Court ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law because all versions constitute the 
same legal instrument. 
The paradox is that if all versions form part of the same legal instrument it means 
individuals are bound also by a norm of which they may not know or understand the 
content (Van Calster 1997:365). It could then be argued that the choice to have equally 
authentic texts, which are actually translations, in fact increases uncertainty and 
diminishes legal certainty (Wouter 2006:43). 
Despite these concerns about the possibility of reconciling multilingualism and legal 
certainty, I agree with Paunio in that the two concepts can be reconciled. The above 
concerns simply demonstrate that “legal certainty cannot be transposed as such into the 
multilingual EU legal system” (2011:5). As it was mentioned before, multilingualism 
forces us to look at legal certainty in new terms and move away from a more positivistic 
view on legal certainty which relies on language as a static basis of interpretation. In 
this respect, I propose to place emphasis on the acceptability of judicial decision-
                                                            
77 European Parliament, the Council  and the Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 
1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation, 17/03/1999, C 073, p.. 
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78 See Case 19/67 van der Vecht [1967] E.C.R. 345. 
79 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 41. 
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making (communicative legal certainty), where teleological, purpose-oriented method 
of interpretation is essential. With its legal reasoning the Court can then increase legal 
certainty. 
As section 8 and 9 will explain, context will play a very important role when 
adjudicating. Similarly, argumentation, i.e., the method the Court uses to reconcile 
texts, will be crucial. 
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PART II: TACKLING LINGUISTIC DIVERGENCES IN EU LAW 
 
8. UNIFORM INTERPRETATION 
8.1. Comparison of the language versions: criterion of doubt? 
In the case Van der Vecht80 a worker was employed to work in Belgium but at that time 
his company was engaged in some works in the Netherlands. The company was doing 
some work for a German undertaking. The worker, Mr. Van der Vecht, was conveyed 
by bus everyday from his work in Belgium to the Netherlands. One day the bus had an 
accident in the territory of the Netherlands. He was seriously injured but the company 
did not take any action regarding the insurance in Belgium nor in the Netherlands. Mr. 
Van der Vecht claimed damages but it was not clear which law was applicable. 
The Centrale Raad van Beroep requested a preliminary ruling and the first question 
concerned the interpretation of Article 12 on the  point “whether a worker who is 
employed in the territory of a member state [Belgium] other than that in which he 
resides [Netherlands] and in which the undertaking which employs him is established, 
but who, in order to carry out his work, is conveyed daily by and at the expense of his 
employer between his place of residence and his place of work, is employed in the 
territory of the latter state within the meaning of article 12 of regulation no. 3, even 
during the journey to the former state and, in particular, during that part of the journey 
which takes place in the territory of the latter member state”.81  
The problem revolved around the interpretation of Articles 12 and 13 of Regulation 
No. 3 of the Council of the EEC concerning social security for migrant workers 
(Official Journal of 16 December 1958, p 561). By virtue of Article 12 of Regulation 
No. 3, a worker is subject to the social security legislation of the State in whose 
territory he is employed. In the wording existing prior to the introduction of 
Regulation No. 24/64, Article 13 (a) laid down an exception to the above rule for 
workers who are permanently resident in the territory of one Member State and who 
are employed in another Member State’s territory. 
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The versions read as follows: 
The Italian and German versions “contain comparable if not identical terms”.82 
However, “if this phrase is considered only as it appears in the Dutch version, it might 
suggest that a worker who is engaged solely in order to work in the territory of a 
Member State in which he does not permanently reside and in which the undertaking 
which employs him is not established is not covered by Article 13 (a), with the result 
that the general rule laid down in Article 12 is applicable to him”.83  
The court invoked the principle of uniform interpretation stating that “the need for a 
uniform interpretation of Community regulations necessitates that this passage should 
not be considered in isolation, but that, in cases of doubt, it should be interpreted and 
applied in the light of the versions existing in the other three languages”.84  
The Court decided that “Article 13 (a) applies equally to a worker who has been 
engaged exclusively to work in the territory of a Member State other than that in which 
the establishment to which he is normally attached is situated, in so far as the probable 
                                                            
82 Ibid p. 354 
83 Ibid, p. 353. 
84 Ibid, p. 354. 
NL 
[...] Een bedrijf...waarbij zij gewoonlijk werkzaam zijn [...]  (an establishment...by 
which they are normally employed) 
FR 
[...] un établissement dont il (le travailleur) relève normalement [...] (an 
establishment to which he (the worker) is normally attached) 
IT 
[...] uno stabilimento de cui i lavoratori dipendono normalmente [...] (an 
establishment on which workers normally depend) 
DE 
[...] einen Betrieb hat, dem dir Arbeitnehmer gewöhnlich angehören [...] (an 
establishment to which workers normally belong) 
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duration of his employment in the territory of that State does not exceed twelve 
months”.85 
Similarly, in Konservenfabrik Lubella86, the Court also stated that “the need for a 
uniform interpretation of Community regulations makes it impossible for a given piece 
of legislation to be considered in isolation and requires that, in case of doubt, it should 
be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official 
languages (Case 9/79 Koschninske v. Raad van Arbeid [1979] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, 
and Case C-372/88 Cricket St Thomas v. Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales 
[1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19)”.87 
 What is important from these judgements is the expression “in cases of doubt”. It 
seems that only when there is a doubt is comparison required. Derlén calls this criterion 
of doubt (Derlén 2009:34).  
However, in other cases, the Court does not mention the criterion of doubt. In the 
Kraaijeveld88 case the Court reminded the obligation to compare, stating that 
“interpretation of a provision of Community law involves a comparison of the language 
versions.”  
In the Ferriere89 case, the Court referred to Van der Vecht and CILFIT and affirmed that 
“Community provisions must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the 
versions existing in the other Community languages.” The Court stated explicitly that 
all language versions had to be consulted even if the version at hand was clear and 
unambiguous in isolation. The case concerned what was then Article 85 EC (now 101 
TFEU) and the question was whether the relevant agreement should have as its object 
and effect the restriction of competition within the Community, or if it was sufficient 
that either that object or effect was at hand.  
 
 
 
                                                            
85 Ibid. 
86 Case 64/95 Konservenfabrik Lubella Friedrich Büker GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Cottbuss 
[1996] E.C.R. I-5105. 
87 Ibid, para. 17. 
88 Case 72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland 
[1996] E.C.R. I-05403, para. 25. 
89 Case 219/95 P Ferriere Nord vs Commission [1997] E.C.R. I-4411. 
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The different versions of Article 85 EC read as follows: 
IT 
Sono incompatibili con il mercato comune e vietati tutti gli accordi tra imprese, 
tutte le decisioni di associazioni di imprese e tutte le pratiche concordate che 
possano pregiudicare il commercio tra Stati  membri e che abbiano per oggetto e 
per effetto di impedire, restringere o falsare il gioco della concorrenza all'interno 
del mercato comune 
EN 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market 
 
ES 
Serán incompatibles con el mercado común y quedarán prohibidos todos los 
acuerdos entre empresas, las decisiones de asociaciones de empresas y las 
prácticas concertadas que puedan afectar al comercio entre los Estados miembros 
y que tengan por objeto o efecto impedir, restringir o falsear el juego de la 
competencia dentro del mercado común 
FR 
Sont incompatibles avec le marché commun et interdits tous accords entre 
entreprises, toutes décisions d'associations d'entreprises et toutes pratiques 
concertées, qui sont susceptibles d'affecter le commerce entre États membres et 
qui ont pour objet ou pour effet d'empêcher, de restreindre ou de fausser le jeu de 
la concurrence à l'intérieur du marché commun 
DE 
Mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt unvereinbar und verboten sind alle Vereinbarungen 
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The Italian language version seemed to suggest that both criteria had to be fulfilled if 
Article 85 was to apply, while the other language versions made it clear that conditions 
were alternative and not cumulative. The approach in Ferriere is somewhat difficult to 
interpret (Derlén 2009:34). It would appear that the Court did not seek to change their 
line of adjudication since it referred to the Van der Vecht case. The Court might be 
trying to say that a provision cannot be regarded as clear and unambiguous unless all 
language versions have been consulted (Kjaer 2011:147). 
Moreover, in the EMU Tabac90 case, the criterion of doubt is even more confusing. In 
the English language version of the judgement paragraph 36 states (italics added) as 
follows91: 
Furthermore, to discount two language versions, as the applicants in the main 
proceedings suggest, would run counter to the Court's settled case-law to the 
effect that the need for a uniform interpretation of Community regulations makes 
it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, 
on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the 
versions existing in the other official languages (see, in particular, Case 9/79 
Koschniske [1979] ECR 2717, paragraph 6). Lastly, all the language versions 
must, in principle, be recognised as having the same weight and this cannot vary 
according to the size of the population of the Member States using the language 
in question. 
However, the German version states (italics added) as follows: 
Ferner würde die Nichtbeachtung zweier Sprachfassungen, wie dies die Kläger 
des Ausgangsverfahrens vorschlagen, im Widerspruch zur ständigen 
                                                            
90 Case 296/95The Queen v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, ex parte EMU Tabac SARL, The 
Man in Black Ltd, John Cunningham [1998] E.C.R. I-1605. 
91 Example taken from DERLÉN, Matthias (2009): Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law, 
p35. 
zwischen Unternehmen, Beschlüsse von Unternehmensvereinigungen und 
aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltensweisen, welche den Handel zwischen 
Mitgliedstaaten zu beeinträchtigen geeignet sind und eine Verhinderung, 
Einschränkung oder Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs innerhalb des Gemeinsamen 
Marktes 
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Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes stehen, wonach es die Notwendigkeit einer 
einheitlichen Auslegung der Gemeinschaftsverordnungen verbietet, im Fall von 
Zweifeln eine Bestimmung für sich allein zu betrachten, sondern vielmehr dazu 
zwingt, sie unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Fassungen in den anderen 
Amtssprachen auszulegen (vgl. insbesondere Urteil vom 12. Juli 1979 in der 
Rechtssache 9/79, Koschniske, Slg. 1979, 2717, Randnr. 6). Schließlich ist 
grundsätzlich allen Sprachfassungen der gleiche Wert beizumessen, der nicht je 
nach Umfang der Bevölkerung der Mitgliedstaaten, die die betreffende Sprache 
gebraucht, schwanken kann.  
The German version states “im Fall von Zweifeln” (in case of doubt, instead of 
interpreting a provision in isolation, it should be interpreted in the light of the versions 
in the other official languages) while the English version does not. 
How should the judgement be interpreted? The language of the case was English but if 
we check the French version it also uses the criterion of doubt: 
[…] la nécessité d'une interprétation uniforme des règlements communautaires 
exclut que, en cas de doute, le texte d'une disposition soit considéré isolément, et 
exige au contraire qu'il soit interprété et appliqué à la lumière des versions 
établies dans les autres langues officielles […] 
As we have mentioned before, the working language of the Court of Justice is French, 
which means that all the judgements are drafted in French and then translated into the 
language of the case (Derlén 2009:5). The problem is from a de jure perspective the 
language of the case is the only authentic version, and the French carries no weight 
unless it is the language of the case. However, from a de facto perspective, it is 
reasonable to assume that the French version best express the inention of the Court 
(ibid). 
In EMU Tabac the language of the case was English and it is the only authentic version. 
However, the Court resorts as well to the criterion of uniform interpretation and the 
need to interpret the provision in the light of the other versions. 
The Court has dealt with similar cases in later judgements. In Kingdom of Spain v. 
Council of the European Union,92 when dealing with the concept of “management of 
water resources” the Court referred to the Kraaijeveld case and reminded that “it 
                                                            
92 Case 36/98 Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union [2001] E.C.R. I-779. 
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follows from the consistent case-law of the Court that an interpretation of a provision of 
community law involves a comparison of the language versions”.93 
On the basis of the above examples, the general use of the criterion of doubt is unclear 
(Wouter 2010:27, Kjaer 2011:148). The Ferriere case makes it clear that no reliance 
can be placed on a single language version if a divergence of meaning is detected. As a 
working method, a clear and unambiguous wording can be presumed to express the 
correct meaning  of the provision, but if a divergence of meaning  is detected, the clear 
meaning cannot be allowed to take precedence over the other versions (see Kjaer 
2011:147).  
8.2. Right to rely on a single language version 
While the general use of the criterion of doubt was not clear, the right to rely on a single 
language version could still be claimed as part of the principle of legal certainty. The 
Court made it clear that it regards the principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations as important aspects of the Union’s legal system (Kjaer 2011:148). It 
would be reasonable to assume that the principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations grant a right to rely on the wording of a single language version. The 
Skoma-Lux case seems to support this interpretation (see section 6.2.3.1). 
It is worth remarking on the difference between the criteria of interpretation established 
in the Vienna Convention states and the criteria applied in the EU. 
In Article 33 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trieties of 1969 the 
presumption of similar meaning was introduced instead of a duty to compare the 
different language versions: 
Article 33  
Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages  
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties 
agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.  
                                                            
93 Ibid, para. 47. 
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2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text 
was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so 
provides or the parties so agree.  
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each 
authentic text.  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when 
a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty shall be 
adopted.  
Despite this, many authors have questioned the interpretation of Article 33 of the 
VCLT94. What seems clear is that the presumption in Article 33.3 ceases to operate in 
the face of a vague or ambiguous provision (Derlén 2009:24). Once a divergence of 
meaning has been discovered, Article 33.4 comes into play. If the divergence cannot be 
removed using Article 31 and 32, the meaning which best reconciles the different 
versions with regard to the object and purpose of the treaty shall be adopted (ibid:25). 
In the EU the situation is different. With respect to the system of international law, the 
EU legal system has special features and characteristics of its own. The Court of Justice 
of the EU does not follow any written rules of interpretation and case-law should be 
analysed in order to elucidate the criteria applied. 
As far as national courts are concerned, in the CILFIT case the Court made it clear 
under which circumstances a national court of last instance can refrain from requesting 
a preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU). According to the Court, “the correct 
application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved”.95 This 
is known as the acte clair principle. Although the national courts have this margin of 
discretion, they are required to take into account the multilingual character of EU 
legislation because it “is drafted in several languages and the different language 
                                                            
94 For a lengthier discussion see DERLÉN, Matthias (2009): Multilingual Interpretation of European 
Union Law, p. 22. 
95 Case 283/81  Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health [1982] E.C.R. 3415, para. 
16. 
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versions are all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law 
thus involves a comparison of the different language versions”.96 
Therefore, before reaching the conclusion that there is no reasonable doubt with regard 
to the correct application of EU legislation, national courts are required to compare the 
different language versions. In spite of this, in his extensive study, Derlén concludes 
that national courts play limited attention to the multilingual interpretation of EU law 
and comparison of the different versions is not done on a routine basis (Derlén 
209:350). 
Furthermore, when comparing different language versions, how many versions should 
be used? Translators may consider one or two versions other than the original and the 
target text; many national courts have limited resources to compare more than two 
versions and the Court of Justice is the one with the resources to carry out the proper 
comparison. In case of linguistic divergences difficult to solve we should then rely on 
the Court as having the competence to decise on interpretation problems.  
 
9. TELEOLOGICAL CRITERIA: purpose and general scheme of the rules 
Moreover, invoking the principle of uniform interpretation the Court also resorted to 
teleological criteria of interpretation.  
The Stauder97 case dealt with the decision by the Commission on measures to allow 
certain categories of consumers to buy butter at a reduced price (Official Journal 1969 L 
52/9). This decision authorised Member States to make butter available at a reduced 
price to certain categories of consumers who are beneficiaries under a social welfare 
scheme and whose income did not permit them to buy butter at normal prices. The 
problem at issue was the wording of Article 4 because it presented some divergence 
between the different language versions (bold added): 
 
 
 
                                                            
96 Ibid, para. 18. 
97 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 419. 
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There is a clear discrepancy; the German and Dutch versions require the name of the 
beneficiary while the French and Italian do not specify that. 
The Federal Republic of Germany made use of this authorization and issued cards 
which consisted of detachable coupons with a stub which had to bear the name and 
address of the beneficiary in order to be valid. According to Chapter V of the above 
directives, the retailer when selling butter at a reduced price may only accept coupons 
still attached to the stub, on which must appear, among other things, the name of the 
beneficiary. 
An important point in this judgement is that the Commission argued that the version to 
be preferred is the French version if the decision’s origin was born in mind. However, 
the Court does not seem to take this argument as a criterion of interpretation and 
DE 
'Die Mitgliedstaaten treffen alle erforderlichen Maßnahmen damit ... die 
Begünstigten der in Artikel 1 vorgesehenen Maßnahmen Butter nur gegen einen 
auf ihren Namen ausgestellten Gutschein erhalten können.' ('Member 
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that . . . those entitled to benefit 
from the measures laid down in Article 1 may only receive butter in exchange for 
a coupon issued in their names.') 
NL 
„de begunstigden van de artikel 1 bedoelde maatregelen slechts boter kunnen 
verkrijgen in ruil voor een op naam gestelde bon“ 
FR 
Les bénéficiaires des mesures prévues à l’article 1er ne puissent obtenir du beurre 
qu’en échange d’un bon individualisé. 
IT 
I beneficiari delle misure di cui all’articolo 1 possano ottenere del burro solo in 
cambio di un buono individualizzato 
Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil? 
50 
 
insisted on the necessity of uniform application and accordingly, uniform interpretation. 
It reminded that it is impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation and that 
the provision needs to be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author 
and the aim he seeks to achieve, in the light in of the versions in all four languages.98 
The Court finally ruled that “the second indent of Article 4 of Decision No. 69/71/ 
(EEC) of 12 February 1969, as rectified by Decision No. 69/244/(EEC), is to be 
interpreted as only requiring the identification of those benefiting from the measures for 
which it provides; it does not, however, require or prohibit their identification by name 
so as to enable checks to be made”.99 
In the Bouchereau case,100 a worker of French nationality was brought before the 
Marlborough Street Magistrates’ Court on a charge of unlawful possession of drugs. 
Bouchereau pleaded guilty and the Court intended to make a recommendation for 
deportation to the Secretary of State. 
The Marlborough Street Court asked the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling to 
answer, among others, the following question: “Whether a recommendation for 
deportation made by a national court of a Member State to the executive authority of 
that State (such recommendation being persuasive but not binding on the executive 
authority) constitutes a "measure" within the meaning of Article 3 (1) and (2) of 
Directive No. 64/221/EEC”. 101 
That question sought to know whether a court, which under national legislation has 
jurisdiction to recommend to the executive authority the deportation of a national of 
another Member State, must take into account the limitations resulting from the Treaty 
and from Directive No. 64/221/EEC on the exercise of the powers which, in that area, 
are reserved for Member States.102 
The issue was the interpretation of the term “measures” because there was some 
divergence between the different language versions. In the English version the term 
“measures” is used in both article 2 and 3. However, in other language versions 
different terms are used: 
                                                            
98 Ibid, para.3. 
99 Ibid, ruling I. 
100 Case 30/77 Régina v. Pierre Bouchereau [1977] E.C.R. 1999. 
101 Ibid, p. 2001. 
102 Case 30/77 Bouchereau, para. 7. 
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EN 
Article 2 Article 3 
“measures” “measures” 
1. This Directive relates to all measures 
concerning entry into their territory, issue 
or renewal of residence permits, or 
expulsion from their territory, taken by 
Member States on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health. 
1. Measures taken on grounds of 
public policy or of public security 
shall be based exclusively on the 
personal conduct of the individual 
concerned. 
 
ES 
Article 2 Article 3 
“disposiciones” “medidas” 
1. La presente Directiva se refiere a las 
disposiciones relativas a la entrada en el 
territorio, a la concesión o renovación del 
permiso de residencia, o al abandono del 
territorio, que sean adoptadas por los 
Estados miembros, por razones de orden 
público, seguridad o de salud públicas. 
1. Las medidas de orden público o de 
seguridad pública, deberán estar 
fundamentadas, exclusivamente, en el 
comportamiento personal del individuo a 
que se apliquen. 
FR 
Article 2 Article 3 
“dispositions” “mesures” 
1. La présente directive concerne les 
dispositions relatives à l'entrée sur le 
territoire, à la délivrance ou au 
renouvellement du titre de séjour, ou à 
l'éloignement du territoire, qui sont prises 
par les États membres pour des raisons 
d'ordre public, de sécurité publique ou de 
1. Les mesures d'ordre public ou de 
sécurité publique doivent être fondées 
exclusivement sur le comportement 
personnel de l'individu qui en fait l'objet. 
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santé publique. 
DE 
Article 2 Article 3 
“Vorschriften” “Maßnahmen” 
(1) Diese Richtlinie betrifft die 
Vorschriften für die Einreise, die 
Erteilung oder Verlängerung der 
Aufenthaltserlaubnis oder die Entfernung 
aus dem Hoheitsgebiet, welche die 
Mitgliedstaaten aus Gründen der 
öffentlichen Ordnung, Sicherheit oder 
Gesundheit erlassen. 
(1) Bei Maßnahmen der öffentlichen 
Ordnung oder Sicherheit darf 
ausschließlich das persönliche Verhalten 
der in Betracht kommenden 
Einzelpersonen ausschlaggebend sein. 
 
The Government of the UK stated that the term 'measures' used in the English text in 
both Articles 2 and 3 shows that it is intended to have the same meaning in each case 
and that it emerges from the first recital in the preamble to the directive that when used 
in Article 2 the expression only refers to provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action, to the exclusion of actions of the judiciary.103 
The Court ruled that “a comparison of the different language versions of the provisions 
in question shows that with the exception of the Italian text all the other versions use 
different terms in each of the two articles, with the result that no legal consequences can 
be based on the terminology used”.104 It continued invoking the principle of uniform 
interpretation reminding that “in the case of divergence between the versions the 
provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general 
scheme of the rules of which it forms a part.” 
As a conclusion, the Court ruled that “any action affecting the right of persons coming 
within the field of application of Article 48 of the Treaty to enter and reside freely in the 
Member States under the same conditions as the nationals of the host State constitutes a 
'measure' for the purposes of Article 3 (1) and (2) of Directive No. 64/221/EEC. That 
                                                            
103 Ibid, para. 13. 
104 Ibid, para. 14. 
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concept includes the action of a court which is required by law to recommend in certain 
cases the deportation of a national of another Member State where such 
recommendation constitutes a necessary prerequisite for a decision to make a 
deportation order”.105 
Another question was the interpretation of the words “public policy” in Article 48 (3) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The Court stated that the 
concept of public policy “must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each Member State without being subject to control by the 
institutions of the Community policy in the context of the Community”.106  The Court 
also considered that “the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of 
public policy may vary from one country to another and from one period to another and 
it is therefore necessary in this matter to allow the competent national authorities an area 
of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty and the provisions adopted for its 
implementation”.107 
The Court’s conclusion was that recourse by a national authority to the concept of 
public policy presupposes the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.108 
The case Ekro v. Produktschap voor vee en vlees,109 dealt with the interpretation of 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2787/81 of 25 September 1981 fixing the export 
refunds on beef and veal (Official Journal 1981, L 271, p. 44) in relation to boned or 
boneless cuts of meat which include a piece of "thin flank". 
The Court also resorted to uniform interpretation and the principle of equality and 
remarked that “the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express 
reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning 
and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation 
throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the 
provision and the purpose of the relevant regulations”.110 
                                                            
105 Ibid, ruling (1) p. 2015. 
106 Ibid, para. 33. 
107 Ibid, para. 34. 
108 Ibid, Ruling (3), p 2015. 
109 Case 327/82 Ekro v. Produktschap voor vee en vlees [1984] E.C.R. 107 para. 11. 
110 Ibid, para. 11. 
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The case Commission v. United Kingdom 111 revolved around the definition of the 
concept of the origin of goods. During 1979 and 1980 the fishing industry in the 
Community was in difficulties owing to declining catches, in particular of cod, and 
overcapacity in terms of fishing vessels. British trawlers sailed to a fishing zone in the 
Baltic Sea over which Poland claims exclusive rights. 
In the absence of an agreement between the EEC and Poland permitting Community 
vessels to fish in those waters participation in joint fishing operations with Polish 
vessels seemed to be the means of enabling Community vessels to gain access to them. 
The Polish vessels were supplied with quantities of fish by way of recompense in kind. 
British trawlers cast empty nets into the sea which were taken over by Polish trawlers. 
The Polish trawlers trawled the nets without at any time taking them on board or 
entering territorial waters. When the trawl was completed, the British trawlers drew 
alongside the Polish vessels and lifted the nets, the ends of which were passed to them 
by the Polish vessels. The contents of the nets were taken on board the British trawlers, 
which then took the fish to the United Kingdom.112 
The problem was to define whether the fish was of Polish origin and subject to import 
duties, since Poland did not belong to the Community at that time. The European 
Commission brought an action claiming that: 
Article 4 of the aforementioned Regulation No. 802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 
provides as follows: 
(1) Goods wholly obtained or produced in one country shall be considered as 
originating in that country. 
(2) The expression "goods wholly obtained or produced in one country" means: 
(e) products of hunting or fishing carried on therein, 
(f) products of sea-fishing and other products taken from the sea by 
vessels registered or recorded in that country and flying its flag.' 
On the basis of a literal interpretation of Article 4 (2) (f) of Regulation No. 802/68, the 
Commission takes the view that the phrase at issue, 'taken from the sea' ('extraits de la 
                                                            
111 Case 100/84 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland [1985] E.C.R. 1169. 
112 Ibid, para. 2 and 3. 
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mer'), must be interpreted as signifying not only the act of taking out of the sea but the 
act of separating a substance from the whole of which it is a part. In the case of fishing 
this cannot mean anything other than the act of catching fish in the net and so separating 
them from the sea where they lived before being caught. 
The different versions of Article 4 (2) (f) of Regulation No. 802/68 read as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the phrase 'extraits de la mer' or its equivalent employed in the 
other language versions can mean both 'taken out of the sea' and 'separated from the 
sea'. Even allowing that the English version, which uses the phrase 'taken from the sea', 
has the significance attributed to it by the United Kingdom ('complete removal from the 
water'), the German version of the regulation employs the term 'gefangen' meaning 
'caught', which, as the United Kingdom itself acknowledges, ‘seems ... to be an 
inappropriate term to use'.113  Accordingly, a comparative examination of the various 
language versions of the regulation does not enable a conclusion to be reached in favour 
                                                            
113 Ibid, para. 15. 
EN 
 Products of sea-fishing and other products taken from the sea by vessels 
registered or recorded in that country and flying its flag 
FR 
Les produits de la pêche maritime et autres produits, extraits de la mer a 
partir de bateaux immatricules ou enregistres dans ce pays et battant pavillon 
de ce même pays 
ES 
Los productos de la pesca marítima y otros productos extraídos del mar por 
barcos matriculados o registrados en este país y que enarbolen su pabellón  
DE 
Erzeugnisse der seefischerei und andere meereserzeugnisse, die von schiffen 
aus gefangen worden sind, die in diesem land ins schiffsregister eingetragen 
oder angemeldet sind und die die flagge dieses landes führen 
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of any of the arguments put forward and so no legal consequences can be based on the 
terminology used.114 
The Court reminded its adjudication in the Bouchereau case stating that “in the case of 
divergence between the language versions the provision in question must be interpreted 
by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part”.115 
It finally ruled that “for the purposes of the application of Article 4 (2) (f) of Regulation 
No. 802/68 in the case of a joint fishing operation the origin of the fish must be 
determined by reference not to the flag flown by the vessel which merely raises the nets 
out of the water but to the flag flown by the vessel which carries out the essential part of 
the operation of catching fish, that is to say, in particular, the location of the fish and 
netting them so that they can no longer move freely in the sea”.116 
Moreover, the need for uniform interpretation and the duty to compare other language 
versions has been made very clear in the Cricket St. Thomas judgement.117  
In this case, it was necessary to define the object of the monopoly of the Milk 
Marketing Boards in the United Kingdom, i.e., milk producers’ organisations set up in 
the 1930s to manage the milk and milk products market. After the UK acceded to the 
European Community, various amendments of regulations concerning the common 
organisation of the dairy market enabled the Milk Marketing Boards operating in the 
UK to be recognised with regard to the prerogatives they enjoy in the marketing of 
milk, in particular their exclusive right to buy milk from producers established in their 
area. 
Cricket St. Thomas was a producer-processor under agreement with the Milk Marketing 
Board and stopped paying contributions to the Board, which led the latter to bring 
action to recover the sums. Before the High Court, Cricket St. Thomas claimed that the 
exclusive right to buy milk pasteurised by the producer was contrary to Community 
law. The High Court then asked the Court for a preliminary ruling. 
Among the questions, it was studied whether the concept of milk produced and 
marketed without processing includes milk pasteurized by the producers in question. 
                                                            
114 Ibid, para. 16. 
115 Ibid, para. 17. 
116 Ibid, para. 21. 
117 Case 372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v. Cricket St. Thomas Estate [1990] E.C.R. 
I-1370. 
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Regarding this point, there were conflicting interpretations of Article 25(l) (a) of the 
basic regulation, No. 804/68, as amended, particularly on the basis of the different 
language versions of that subparagraph. “Cricket St. Thomas relies on the English 
version to support the interpretation that the Board's exclusive purchasing right does not 
cover pasteurized milk, while the Board relies on the other language versions to reach 
the conclusion that the exclusive right in question extends to milk pasteurized by 
producers.” 
The versions of Article 25(l) (a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1421/78 read as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The English version of Article 25(l) (a) of the basic regulation appeared to exclude from 
the Board's exclusive purchasing right any milk which had been processed, referring to 
'the milk which they produce and market without processing'. However, the Court 
detected that other provisions in the same language version, which defined the Board's 
commercial powers according to the state of preparation of the milk or milk products, 
contained a number of terminological discrepancies in the use of the terms 'processing', 
'manufacture' and 'conversion'.  
The Court considered that the other language versions, particularly the French and 
German versions, both consistent in their use of the terms in question, contained a 
distinction between the concept of the treatment of milk and processing operations: 
“In those versions, Article 7(1) and Article 10(2) of Regulation No. 1422/78 I-
1375 JUDGEMENT OF 27. 3. 1990 —CASE C-372/88 and Article 3(1) of 
EN 
...the milk which they produce and market without processing 
FR 
…le lait produit et mis en vente en l’état… 
DE 
...die von ihnen erzeugte und in unverarbeitetem Zustand auf dem Markt 
gebrachte Milch anzukaufen... 
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Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1565/79 of 25 July 1979 laying down rules 
for implementing Regulation (EEC) No. 1422/78 distinguish between milk 
which is 'en l'état', meaning milk as such, and 'produits transformés', meaning 
products processed from milk”.118 
In any event, the Court decided in line with the principle of uniform interpretation 
adjudicating that “the English version of Article 25(l) (a) of Regulation No. 804/68 
cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to 
override the other language versions in this regard. Such an approach would be 
incompatible with the requirement for the uniform application of Community law”. 119 
A reference was made to Case 19/67 Van der Vecht, emphasizing the need for uniform 
interpretation of Community regulations, which means that “a particular provision 
should not be considered in isolation but in cases of doubt should be interpreted and 
applied in the light of the other languages”. Similarly, the Court referred to Case 30/77 
Bouchereau, reminding that the different language versions of a Community text must 
be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the 
language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the 
purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part. 
By way of conclusion, it can be said that exact equivalence between the different 
versions is difficult to achieve. As Gémar (2006: 71) puts it, “language is still the 
common denominator with all its limits and ambiguities reflecting the impossibility of 
the human mind to translate in a non-equivocal manner-using the Saussarian sense- as 
bearer of the definite sense conjured by a mental image.”  Perfect equivalence between 
the content of the source text and that of the target text is, according to George 
Steiner120 a myth. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice of the EU has used different 
mechanisms to ensure the uniform application of EU legislation. 
 
                                                            
118 Ibid, para. 16. 
119 Ibid, para. 18. 
120 Cited in Gémar 2006:71, STEINER (1992): After Babel, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press 
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10. TRANSLATING IN A SUPRANATIONAL ORGANISATION  
The EU constitutes a legal order with its own features, its own personality and its own 
legal capacity.121 It can be said that the EU has a legal system of its own and as a 
result it has conceptual autonomy and terminological autonomy (Gómez González-
Jover 2002:5).122 In fact, the Court of Justice of the EU has stated that “legal concepts 
do not necessarily have the same meaning in community law and in the law of the 
various member states”.123   
Despite the fact that legal translators do not really mediate between two legal 
systems, they face other kinds of problems (Kjær 1999: 66) and other factors come 
into play in the translation of legal texts (Sarcevic 2010:19). It must be taken into 
account that the EU legal order is composed of twenty-seven Member States, each 
with its own legal system, and this poses a challenge for translators.  
As was mentioned before, this study deals with instrumental translation as defined by 
Nord (1991:72), which means translators elaborate texts that will be equally authentic 
and will become part of a legal instrument. As a result, translators are expected to 
produce texts that are equal in legal effect.  
Regarding the notion of “legal equivalence”, it was used by Beaupré (1986:179), Gémar 
(2006:76) and Sarcevic (2010:29). This last explains that neither Beaupré nor Gémar 
have provided a definition for “legal equivalence”. Therefore, she states that “legal 
equivalence can be regarded as a synthesis of content, intent and legal effect, with the 
emphasis on the latter” (2010:20). According to Gémar, the problem of achieving 
equivalent legal effects in the translated text is not the same for the translator and the 
jurist.  The translator generally strives for linguistic equivalence, the lawyer for legal 
equivalence. He then concludes that in both cases, it is the meeting and the harmonious 
fusion of the two constitutive ingredients of the text – form and content- that produce 
the desired equivalence. It is definitely a combination of different factors what allows 
                                                            
121 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585 states: “By creating a Community of unlimited 
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation 
of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both 
their nationals and themselves”. 
122 The author states: “Se trata, pues, de un Derecho multilingüe que exige una aplicación uniforme, 
uniformidad que tiene como consecuencias necesarias la autonomía conceptual y la autonomía 
terminológica frente a los Derechos internos […]” 
123  Case 283/81 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health [1982] E.C.R. 3415, para. 19. 
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for equivalence; the translator looks for linguistic equivalence and should also think of 
the legal consequences that translating a text in a way or another will have. In this way, 
the translator will strive for legal equivalence. 
10.1. EU terminology different from that of the Member States’ 
When translating texts about legal concepts recommended or imposed at the Europe-
wide level, it may be misleading to translate a generic term with the “correct” specific 
term used at national level, even if an exact equivalent exists. Using a correct but 
nationally specific term could lead to confusion; a supranational term which has no 
immediate national “meaning” may be preferable (Wagner et al 2002:64). 
Eurojargon is also excusable when used to refer to genuinely Europe-wide concepts that 
have no equivalent at national level and they may be convenient because they avoid 
confusion. For example, “subsidiarity” (taking decisions and action at the lowest 
feasible regional, national or central level) is probable preferable to “devolution”, which 
means the same in the UK when talking of the relations with Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (Ibid). 
Moreover, the Court has explicitly referred to this question. In Rockfon AS v. 
Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark,124 the Court dealt with the interpretation of 
Article 1 of Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies.  
The company Rockfon A/S is a company which produces and markets insulating 
materials made from mineral wool. Between 10 and 28 November 1989 Rockfon 
dismissed 24 or 25 employees from its workforce of 162. Rockfon did not consult the 
employees concerned nor did it inform in writing the authority with responsibility in the 
matter of redundancies. It is undisputed that, if Rockfon by itself constitutes an 
'establishment', the dismissals were carried out in breach of the consultation 
requirements laid down in Chapter 5a of the 1977 Law which implements the 
Directive.125 The problem was that the Directive did not define the term 'establishment'. 
The Court observed that the term 'establishment', as used in the Directive, is a term of 
Community law and cannot be defined by reference to the laws of the Member States.126 
                                                            
124 Case 449/93 Rockfon AS v. Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark, [1996] ICR 673. 
125 Ibid, para. 13. 
126 Ibid, para. 25. 
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The various language versions of the Directive used somewhat different terms to convey 
the concept in question: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A comparison of the terms used shows that they have different connotations signifying, 
according to the version in question, establishment, undertaking, work centre, local unit 
or place of work.127 
Once again, the Court followed its argument used in Bouchereau and invoked uniform 
interpretation and the need to interpret the provision by reference to the purpose and 
general scheme of the rules of which it forms part. The final ruling is as follows: 
The term 'establishment' appearing in Article 1(1)(a) of the aforesaid directive 
must be understood as meaning, depending on the circumstances, the unit to 
which the workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their  duties. It is 
not essential, in order for there to be an 'establishment', for the unit in question to 
be endowed with a management which can independently affect collective 
redundancies. 
This shows, once again, how subtleties of language may result in important legal issues, 
since at first sight nobody would imagine the interpretation of the concept of 
“establishment” would cause any problem. 
                                                            
127 Ibid, para. 26. 
EN 
 establishment 
FR 
établissement 
ES 
Centro de trabajo 
DE 
Betrieb 
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10.2. Freedom translating EU legislation? 
EU texts follow certain formalisms and a standardised legal terminology: 
All language versions must contain the same sentence breaks so as to enable 
uniform citation. Furthermore, translators are required to use the formulae set 
forth in the Manual of Precedents of each official language. As a result, the 
visual appearance of the authentic texts of a given act is basically the same 
and even the pagination is identical in each language version of the Official 
Journal (Sarcevic 2010:38). 
EU translators must observe the golden rule of terminological consistency. 
Translators are encouraged to write in the genius of the target language, always taking 
into account the macrotextual factors.  
As far as the genius of languages is concerned, the translator of multilingual legislation 
encounters the same interlinguistic lexical and structural divergences as any other 
translator. In a supranational context, terminological harmonization will help with 
notions of law (Prieto 2011b: 206). However, EU legislation is often the result of 
complex negotiations between different interests and ideas. The intention of the authors 
is sometimes not clear.  
Sometimes that ambiguity is deliberate. In some circumstances, reaching agreement on 
the terms of the covered agreements may have necessitated the use of constructive 
ambiguity. Negotiators sometimes leave unresolved particular issues by agreeing on 
language that does not resolve the issue and is capable of more than one interpretation. 
Constructive ambiguity can serve as a placeholder marking an area where negotiators 
accept that it may be appropriate to agree on disciplines but where further negotiation is 
necessary before those disciplines can be specified.128 The result of decision-making 
sometimes requires that the final text adopted is fuzzy and vague so that it can cater for 
different political interests present in the law-making process (Paunio 2011:7). 
Accordingly, the goal of translators is to preserve the unity of the single instrument by 
coordinating the terminology and syntax of all the authentic texts as closely as possible 
(Sarcervic 2010:32). “As in all multilingual law, the ultimate goal is to produce texts in 
                                                            
128 TN/DS/W/82/Add.1, 25 October 2005. 
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the national languages that will promote the uniform application of the single 
instrument (ibid: 37)”. 
In order to achieve that, translators need to study the blurry parts of the texts and, in 
order to be able to find the intended meaning, they have to interpret the text (Prieto 
Ramos 2011b: 208). Of course they have to be objective and should follow the same 
hermeneutic rules that the Court of Justice of the EU would follow. They need to 
transmit the same degree of ambiguity. When faced with a problem, translators have to 
make a textual analysis and take into account the effects that each way of interpreting a 
certain provision can have. They “should be able to foresee how the translation will be 
interpreted and applied by the receivers in the target jurisdictions (Sarcevic 2010:24).”  
Contrary to what some authors think,129 translators do interpret. They should, of course, 
respect the skopos of the text and the macrotextual factors. In this respect, interpreting 
texts is predominantly a quest for the contextual meaning of the texts in order to 
discover what consequences the text has in the legal situation in which the interpretation 
is carried out (Engberg 2002:375).  
Furthermore, Pelage (2011:21) sees overlap in the work of lawyers and translators. 
However, he sees a difference between the two: “lawyers must interpret the text fully 
and completely in order to see whether it is applicable to the actual situation, while 
translators can concentrate more on the concrete written text at hand.” In the EU context 
translators should also take into account the aim and object of the provision because 
they produce texts that become part of the same legal instrument.  
                                                            
129 See for example FELICI, Anarita (2010):  “Translating EU law: legal issues and multiple dynamics”, 
Perspectives: Studies in Translatology, vol. 18, 2, pp. 95-108 
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11. CONCLUSIONS 
The EU creates a legal system, producing rights and obligations for citizens of the 
Member States. Multilingualism could then be seen as a guarantee of legal certainty; the 
citizens have the possibility to read the rules in their own language. 
Legal certainty, predictability and conflict avoidance require the greatest clarity and 
precision in the drafting of legal texts. The fact that EU law is rendered in twenty-three 
languages can alleviate or exacerbate divergences. On the one hand, a comparison of 
different texts may help to resolve an ambiguity inherent in a term or phrase used in one 
language, making clearer the intention of the drafters. Ambiguities in an official text 
may be clarified and overcome by means of another official text (Vismara 2006:64). 
What might appear as a costly hindrance can be turned into a valuable opportunity for 
improving the quality and comprehensibility of the law. 
In addition, since multilingualism forces the Court of Justice to look beyond words in 
individual language versions when reconciling diverging texts, one could say that 
multilingualism represents a possibility for dialogue among legal systems, legal rules 
and legal principles as well as their underlying values and policies, instead of a risk to 
legal certainty (Paunio 2011:9). 
On the other hand, when comparing the different language versions equivalence comes 
into play. The notion of equivalence remains controversial because of the difficulties 
experienced by translation scholars and linguists when attempting to define the term 
precisely.  In the EU institutions, the question of equivalence becomes especially 
important since it must not only be semantic, stylistic and pragmatic equivalence but 
also legal equivalence (González-Jover 2002:1), which makes all language versions 
become the same legal instrument because they are all equally authentic. 
As many authors argue, equivalence, understood as identity, may with reason be 
described as an illusion. At best, legal translation, just as any translation for that matter, 
is only an approximation (Focsaneanu 1970:  262) Paunio 2011:2, Gémar 2006:77). For 
the purpose of this research we have considered equivalence as the balance between 
linguistic equivalence and legal equivalence. Translators should measure how far they 
can depart from the source text in order to keep the intented ambiguities and produce a 
text that leads to the same legal effect. 
Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil? 
65 
 
The Court has done a good job to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU 
law. The Court can, by way of argumentation, assure more legal certainty (Paunio 1995: 
1470). The key is not to be limited to the wording of the rules but rather to go beyond 
the words, trying to elucidate the “autonomous, ‘cross-language’ meaning by taking into 
account context, system, objectives, effectiveness and consequences” (Paunio 2011:6). 
It comes as no surprise that this poses a big challenge to translators working in the EU 
context. They deal with instrumental translation and they become text producers of 
binding rules in another language.  
The multilingual EU legal order ensures communication among the peoples by means 
of translation. The role translation has in gaining, maintaining and supporting 
legitimacy is signicant. Limiting the number of official languages would jeopardise 
transparency. The European Commission has expressed on many occasions that we 
need to support and strengthen multilingualism in the EU  and  help bring the Union's 
policies closer to the citizen, thereby promoting legitimacy, transparency and efficiency 
(European Commission 2009b:1). Besides, favouring monolingualism would mean 
standardization and, with time, the disappearance of cultural identities. 
Throughout this study, many of the points discussed are not black or white; they are in a 
grey area that has to be interpreted. Results confirm that no language regime can be 
considered the best solution in absolute terms (Gazzola 2006:395). I have focused on 
the legal and political reasons for multilingualism but many readers may still wonder 
whether multilingualism is a necessary evil.  
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